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Abstract
Parallels, resemblances, and interconnections between con-
temporary right‐wing populism and the populism of agrarian
movements are examined in this essay. The two are partly
linked through their social base in the countryside. This
paper explores an agenda for political conversation and
research on possible contributions to the twin efforts of
splitting the ranks of right‐wing populists while expanding
the united front of democratic challengers. The challenge
is how to transform the identified interconnections into a
left‐wing political project that can erode right‐wing popu-
lism. This requires a reclaiming of populism. In exploring this
agenda, the paper revisits the ideas and practices of right‐
wing populism and agrarian populism and the awkward
overlaps and fundamental differences between them. It
concludes with a discussion on the challenge of forging a
reformulated class‐conscious left‐wing populism as a coun-
tercurrent to right‐wing populism, and as a possible political
force against capitalism and towards a socialist future.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Both in the past and at present, procapitalist, right‐wing, or even fascist movements and political parties have often
found support from rural communities. Yet there is nothing inherently conservative in rural politics: history has also
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shown how working people in the countryside—that is, peasants, landless labourers, and others—joined the proletar-
iat and other social forces at the barricades and in the trenches during antifeudal or socialist revolutions and antico-
lonial national liberation struggles. Key questions that scholars have grappled with during the past century include
how and why such radical transformations happened from one society to another, and with what implications, and
which strata of the working people in the countryside were the most open to such revolutionary projects. Some of
these scholars come from the same broad theoretical tradition but have competing interpretations, such as Wolf
(1969) and Paige (1975); others represent opposing worldviews, such as Scott (1976) and Popkin (1979). But most
of them were concerned with the “big picture” meanings and implications of the consciousness and exercise of polit-
ical agency of working people in the countryside, as was Barrington Moore Jr. (1967). Their basic question was similar
to that posed by Huizer (1975): how do peasants become revolutionary? Or indeed—the flip side—how do peasants
become reactionary?
Although the era of peasant‐based revolutions has passed, Huizer's question remains relevant and could be
broadened and updated for the current global conjuncture, when there are parallels, resemblances, and intercon-
nections between agrarian populism and the populism of broader political agitations that are regressive in nature
and when the challenge is how to transform such interconnections into a political opportunity that can contribute
to eroding right‐wing populism. The question can be broadened by asking: how do “working people” in the country-
side—peasants, landless labourers, indigenous communities, fishers, pastoralists, lower middle class, and the vast
number of people in the informal sector including those who live and work in nearby small towns—become revo-
lutionary? And it can be updated by asking: how could they join other social forces in the fight against neoliberal
capitalism and contemporary right‐wing populism and rally to support a reconceptualized notion of anti‐capitalist
left‐wing populism that is broadly anchored on socialist principles? Socialism here is broadly defined, following
Erik Olin Wright, as “a deeply democratic and egalitarian organization of power relations within an economy”
(Wright, 2016, p. 102).
In my view, the current conjuncture calls, and could provide a fertile ground, for contemporary anti‐capitalist
agrarian social movements to propel a broad‐based socialist agenda. At the same time, I would argue (a) that the
future of contemporary agrarian social movements, including the broader food sovereignty movement, depends
not only on how consistently anti‐capitalist they are but even more importantly on their willingness and ability to
build their movements and frame their agendas within a socialist framework and perspective (along with Wright's
broad definition) or at least on their being not anti‐socialist and thus their willingness and their ability to actively
coconstruct a pluralist platform for a broad‐based, common political project and (b) that it is essential that any
antiright‐wing populist political project centred on left‐wing populism has a significant component, which comes from
and relates to rural communities.
Historically, successful reforms or revolutions were direct outcomes of the dialectically linked weakening of a
ruling elite and the strengthening of challengers. Political work in defeating contemporary right‐wing populism thus
cannot rely solely on either weakening right‐wing populists or strengthening democratic challengers: both elements
will be needed. It is in this context that the agrarian world could make important contributions to challenging
resurging right‐wing populism because it has the material basis and political potential to split the ranks of right‐wing
populists, at the same time that it can contribute to broadening a countercurrent of class‐conscious left‐wing
populism.
This paper addresses the twin challenges of splitting the ranks of right‐wing populists while expanding the united
front of democratic challengers. It aims to explore an agenda for political conversation, primarily, and academic
research, secondarily, on possible contributions to overall efforts at defeating contemporary right‐wing populism. It
builds on initial and often rough assumptions and tentative hunches and generates questions to which I do not have
the answers. For instance, I do not know what foundational theoretical logic and practical political scaffolding are
necessary and possible for building a class‐conscious left‐wing populism, beyond proposing a vision that is outside
capitalism and which is framed here as a socialist alternative. Finally, I am writing this paper with practical political,
and not academic, concerns as a principal starting point, coming from an activist world view. This is a continuation
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of the conversation with comrades inside the radical emancipatory movements in the Philippines during the late
1980s and the first half of the 1990s.1
In this paper, I use the term “populism” to mean “the deliberate political act of aggregating disparate and even
competing and contradictory class and group interests and demands into a relatively homogenized voice, that is,
‘we, the people’, against an ‘adversarial them’ for tactical or strategic political purposes.” As such, populism is inher-
ently relational. It tends to be a means towards an end rather than an end itself, giving it a very generic character that
is open‐ended and flexible, facilitating easy adaptation by various ideological camps, even competing ones. Two types
of populism are the main subjects of this paper. The first is right‐wing populism, that is, a regressive, conservative, or
reactionary type of populism that promotes or defends capitalism in the name of “the people”; in its current manifes-
tation, it is also xenophobic, nationalist, racist, and/or misogynistic. The second is agrarian populism, that is, that polit-
ical bundling of various rural‐based or rural‐oriented social groups and class interests and issues into a homogenized
category, “the people of the land”; many variants of agrarian populism are anti‐capitalist and try to advance a “peas-
ant way” of alternative development.
I use the term “right‐wing populism” for lack of a better term. The logic of the notion of “populism as a matter of
degree” (see discussion in the next section) extends to the notion of right‐wing populism; that is, some populist cur-
rents lean further towards the right than others, even when they are all fundamentally right wing, given that (a) they
are champions of contemporary capitalism, although the latter may take a variety of forms; (b) they are generally anti‐
socialist; (c) they have disdain for basic democratic institutions, especially human rights; (d) they share a tendency
towards authoritarianism and militarism; and (e) they are xenophobic or racist, and many are misogynistic. Actually,
existing populisms will not find a perfect fit in the term right‐wing populism, but they have no better fit in other terms
either, such as “authoritarian populism” (Akram‐Lodhi, 2018), “populist authoritarianism” (Docena, 2018), neoliberal
authoritarianism/authoritarian neoliberalism (Saad‐Filho, 2018), or “populist nationalism” (Vanaik, 2017a, b; Win,
2018), as there will always be significant outliers. Most of these populist currents have a strong tendency towards
authoritarianism, but again, it is a matter of degree, and a regime may dynamically oscillate towards and away from
populism and authoritarianism (as in the case of Cambodia; see Schoenberger, Beban, & Lamb, 2018). There will
always be exceptions once we deploy a defining term, which is by nature a delimiting term. But resorting to using
the unqualified term populism loses the distinct character of the political moment, which is partly marked by some
kind and degree of “right‐wing‐ness” and “authoritarianism.”
Moreover, the term “right‐wing populism” dovetails with our subsequent discussion of a potential countercurrent,
namely, a “reformulated left‐wing populism.” That discussion will clarify the fundamental differences between what is
a right‐wing or a left‐wing populism, and demonstrate why such clarity is important. It will help to illustrate the absur-
dity of some casual commentaries that put the United States's Trump and Venezuela's Maduro in one basket, for
instance. It will also show that the term left‐wing populism suffers from a similar semantic problem: for example,
Bolivia's Morales is a left‐wing populist but arguably employs some capital‐accumulation strategies with features that
are more to be expected from a contemporary right‐wing regime than a left‐wing regime, such as neoliberal (neo)
extractivism (McKay, 2017), just as the Workers' Party (PT) in Brazil under Lula and Dilma constructed a similar type
of populism (Andrade, 2019).
Finally, the terms right‐wing and left‐wing populisms are used here rather like bookends, ie, as ideal types or as
heuristic tools. In reality, only rarely will any populist current fit neatly into either ideal type. The bookends will, how-
ever, allow us to see a dynamic continuum rather than fixed categories in between, with populist currents and regimes
1An intense debate inside the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and fraternal movements erupted in the late 1980s, leading to multiple breakaway
groups during the first half of the 1990s. A significant part of that debate involved the National Peasant Secretariat of the CPP that started to experiment
with newer forms and goals of peasant mass movement struggles relative to the Maoist orthodoxy of “people's protracted war.” The leadership of the CPP
dismissed such experiments as impetuous petty bourgeois neo‐populism which were to be shunned and suppressed. Later, the broader party debate dete-
riorated into a “revolutionary–counterrevolutionary” framework in which any comradely discussion became impossible. I have been deeply involved in rad-
ical agrarian movements in the Philippines since the early 1980s and have thus been engaged in this debate not in the classrooms but in the trenches. For
further background, see Franco and Borras (2009).
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consolidating features of one of the ideal types but regularly borrowing features from the other. We will see a
shifting, fluid situation in which populists straddle various points between these bookends, constantly morphing away
from ideal types. Perry Anderson's analysis of the brand of populism of Brazil's Bolsonaro and how it is similar to but
at the same time significantly different from its contemporary counterparts in Europe or Trump is a good illustration
(Anderson, 2019). This is an important feature of populism today, and one which renders the terms right‐wing or left‐
wing populism imperfect and imprecise but analytically useful.
In its attempt at homogenizing disparate, often competing interests of various classes and groups, each of the
contemporary right‐wing populisms and progressive agrarian populisms is marked and defined by internal contradic-
tions and, at times, antagonisms (based on class relations, ideological positions, political calculations, among others),
even though the two ideologically opposed populist groups target broadly similar issues and adversaries.2 Scoones
et al. (2018) offer a closer, if preliminary, look at the possible connection between authoritarian populism and the
rural world, trying to frame new ways of asking questions in order to understand such a relationship. The current
paper builds on this.
Despite big claims that the world is now urban, the fact remains that nearly half the world's population, that is
more than three billion people, can be categorized as rural. Rural political tendencies have become swing factors in
many settings and political moments, including electoral politics and democratization more generally.3 Where rural
voters represent a sizeable proportion of voters, if not the majority, the influence of rural issues on populist dis-
courses and agitation is significant. We saw this in the 2014 elections in India4 and in the current political situation
in the Philippines,5 for instance. Even in societies where the rural population is no longer significant compared with
that of cities and mega cities, votes from rural communities—which usually include small towns—can nevertheless be
critical. This was true of the 2016 elections in the United States,6 the 2017 elections in Germany,7 and the 2018 elec-
tions in Russia8 and in Turkey.9 In some countries, there is no clear urban–rural divide in electoral voting behaviour
but rather an upsurge of support in both urban and rural spaces for right‐wing candidates, such as in the 2018
2Brass (1997) offers a critical examination of the relationship between the “new” right and what he clusters together and labels as new populism in the
1960s through the 1990s, in which agrarian themes form (Brass argues), a common bond for the two. This speaks to the themes explored in the present
paper, but with different categorizations of objects of analysis.
3For the latter, see Fox's edited volume on rural democratization with perspectives from Latin America and the Philippines (Fox, 1990).
4BJP and BJP Allies (National Democratic Alliance) won a combined total of 212 seats of the total 342 rural seats (out of the total 543 seats), as compared
with Congress Party and Allies' (United Progressive Alliance) total of 40 rural seats. In terms of vote share, the National Democratic Alliance secured 36.9%
of the total rural vote, compared with 23.7% for the United Progressive Alliance (NES, 2014, p. 130). Thanks to Amod Shah for alerting me to these data,
and for helping me interpret them.
5According to the December 2018 Social Weather Station (SWS) survey, “74% of Filipino adults said they were satisfied with Duterte's performance,
whereas 15% were dissatisfied, for a net satisfaction rating of +60, correctly rounded. This translates to a “very good” rating, said SWS. The remaining
11% were undecided. …The survey also showed that his net satisfaction rating…in urban areas [was] +64, [and] in rural areas: +57 [note: +57 for rural areas
is just 3 points below the overall net satisfaction rating of +60].” (Bueza, 2018, n. p.).
6“Between 2008 and 2016, Republicans' share of the urban vote barely changed and Democrats' share fell by 4 points. In the suburbs, Republicans likewise
did not change much, and Democrats lost 5 points. The shifts were larger in rural areas, where Republicans gained by 9 points, and Democrats lost 11 points.
Of course, some places are more “rural” or “urban” than others—there is a continuum. Strikingly, as you move up that continuum, from the largest metro
areas to the most isolated and sparsely populated rural areas, the vote steadily grows more Republican.” (Kurtzleben, 2016, n.p.).
7“German right‐wing party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) finds more support in rural areas with aging populations: The AfD received 12.6% of all votes
in the parliamentary election on September 24, 2017, making them the third most powerful party in the German parliament. …Generally, the AfD performs
better in rural areas with negative demographic trends—a phenomenon that occurs more frequently in eastern German districts than in western districts.
This allows for the conclusion that perspective is lacking among those living in rural areas with negative demographic developments.” (Franz, Fratzscher,
& Kritikos, 2018, p. 70). Thanks to Sofia Monsalve for bringing this to my attention.
8On the eve of the Presidential Election (February 18, 2018), the Russian Public Opinion Research Center VTsIOM conducted a survey: “If the presidential
elections were held next Sunday and the list of candidates would look like this, then which of these candidates would you most likely vote for?” The results
were as follows: 76.40% of rural residents would vote for Putin. The official results of the election (18 March 2018): 76.69% of Russian people [not just
rural] voted for Putin (VTsIOM, 2018). With thanks to Natalia Mamonova.
9“The AKP's vote share has been consistently higher in the countryside than in the cities. …The approval of the constitutional amendment in the referendum
on April 16, 2017, established a super presidential system without checks and balances. The amendment was passed with a slight majority (51.4%), but
the share of the yes vote in the rural areas was much higher, estimated to be between 56% […] and 62% […].” (Gurel, Kucuk & Tas, forthcoming
2019, n. p.).
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elections in Brazil.10 Moreover, recent transformations in the global political economy require a more nuanced under-
standing of intermediate geographic spaces, namely, small and medium towns that have internalized some features of
both urban and rural social life.11
Furthermore, the issues that help condition the rise of populism in one geographic region may originate from or
be linked to a distant place. For example, the rise of the populous and wealthier industrial belts in south‐east China is
linked to the massive rural‐to‐urban migration from other parts of China, the phenomenon of the left‐behind popu-
lation in the countryside, and the widening gap between rural and urban worlds that forced the national government
to adopt a populist programme, the New Socialist Countryside.12 The rise of these Chinese industrial belts is linked in
turn to the decay of many rural and urban communities in the United States that used to host factories, many of
which shut down as corporate operations migrated to south‐eastern China, among other destinations. Thus, the pop-
ulist impulses in multiple settings—rural China, urban/industrial China, and deindustrialized, abandoned, and
neglected rural and urban communities in the United States—are concretely connected. It is not surprising that,
despite the differences between them, right‐wing populists worldwide are increasingly supporting or encouraging
each other. This has prompted Edelman to raise a question that needs serious reflection: “To what extent are
the world's autocrats—Trump, Duterte, Erdoğan, Modi, Orbán, Putin, among others—simply a mutually reinforcing
collection of erratic rulers? Or are they taking shape as a global authoritarian populist axis?” (Edelman, 2018, p. 1,
emphasis added).
All these factors have resurrected the issue of agrarian populism in broad new ways, requiring us to revisit and
critically examine it against varying contemporary populisms, especially right‐wing populism. It is not only that con-
temporary right‐wing populism has concrete links with the rural world but also that there are awkward parallels,
resemblances, and interconnections between right‐wing populism and agrarian movements, and these are not ran-
dom accidents. The political economy upon which such populisms emerged over long periods of time (Akram‐Lodhi
& Kay, 2010a, b) partly shapes the kind of broader politics that characterize the present conjuncture (Saad‐Filho,
2018). The boundaries between right‐wing populist currents and their social base in the countryside on the one hand,
and the populism of agrarian movements on the other, are porous, blurred, and malleable.
It is in the context of this perspective on agrarian populism—partly in light of its possible interconnection with the
rise of right‐wing populism worldwide today—that we take up the (unexpected) suggestion of a leading sceptic of
contemporary agrarian movements and food sovereignty, Henry Bernstein, to go “beyond the comfort zone of class
purism” and not to dismiss today's agrarian populism. Revisiting the Russian revolution, Bernstein (2018, p. 1146)
notes that the challenge for adherents of Marxist political economy, whose strength is in socioeconomic analysis,
is to have a better grasp of agrarian politics:
The route from the former to the latter entails many additional determinations and complexities, as well as
capacity to confront the contingent, the indeterminate and unanticipated, and to change positions that
goes far beyond the comfort zone of class purism and other illusions. … This points towards a paradox…
namely that while the best of Marxism retains its analytical superiority in addressing the class dynamics
of agrarian change, for a variety of reasons agrarian populism appears a more vital ideological and
10I thank Daniela Calmon for sharing with me comprehensive and fascinating data on the 2018 elections in Brazil and how these can be interpreted through
the current paper's lens.
11In this context, the 2016 national elections in France merit a close and careful look. Nièvre, the poorest département in Burgundy, is a traditional heartland
of the French left. For 40 years, it was the rural power base of the former socialist president François Mitterrand, who was the mayor of the small town of
Chäteau‐Chinon for 20 years. “This place has been leftwing since the French revolution,” one local socialist politician boasted, adding that Nièvre was a focal
point for the French resistance during the Second World War. And yet the Front National more than doubled its vote here in the previous regional elections,
and it is here in Burgundy that Le Pen is hoping for some of her highest scores. …Le Pen's rural target is not just farmers, who are shrinking in number in
France and represent about 1% of the electorate. Her base comprises people living in modest towns and country villages far away from big cities, who have
felt the sharp edge of France's decades of mass unemployment, who have seen factories close and local shops and services disappear; in places where the
population is ageing, young people are leaving and those who stay have to drive long distances to see a doctor or sometimes even to post a letter. (Chrisafis,
2017, n. p.).
12See Ye, Wang, Wu, He, and Liu (2013).
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political force. …In my view, the challenges facing any Marxist agrarian politics would be helped by critical
engagement with the most progressive (anti‐capitalist) of today's agrarian populism, and the diverse rural
struggles it embraces, rather than dismissing a priori all agrarian populism as necessarily and equally
‘wrong’ and ‘reactionary’.
In relation to Bernstein's proposition, it is worth stating again that by left‐wing agrarian movements and the broad
food sovereignty movements; I mean those social movements that are anti‐capitalist in their ideological orientation,
whether this manifests systematically or not, explicitly or otherwise. Many, but not all, of these movements have
socialist ideologies, influences, and leanings or are, at least, not anti‐socialist (especially when seen from Wright's
broad definition of socialism, cited above). These are widely diverse social movements in terms of ideological and
political provenance and are heterogeneous in their class origins and intersecting social identities. Their anti‐capitalist
stance is not uniformly, evenly, and consistently found across and within movements and does not emerge from a
unified ideology. These are movements of small farmers from the industrial North, poor peasants from the Global
South, landless labourers, migrant farmworkers, indigenous peoples, pastoralist organizations, fishers' movements,
women's movements, environmental advocacy groups, climate justice associations, and various radical food activist
groups—bound, to varying degrees, by some principles of food sovereignty—whose class formations are further com-
plicated by their intersecting and messy social identities around gender, generation, race, ethnicity, religion and/or
nationality. The La Via Campesina and the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (with their
regional and national affiliates) are the most politically significant and publicly known global hubs of these broadly
left‐wing agrarian social movements (Edelman & Borras, 2016). These are the movements that are often lumped
together, pejoratively, as populists and dismissed as such.
2 | WHAT IS POPULISM?
What we are keen to examine, following Rancière (2016, p. 102), are the “diverse or even antagonistic figures of
the people, figures constructed by privileging modes of assembling certain distinctive traits, certain capacities or
incapacities: an ethnic people defined by the community of land or blood; ... an ignorant people that the oligarchs
keep at a distance.” Rancière elaborates that the “notion of populism itself constructs a people characterized by
the formidable alloy of a capacity—the brute force of great number—and an incapacity—the ignorance attributed
to that same great number” (ibid.). This connects with Laclau's unit of analysis, which is “not to be the group, as
a referent, but the sociopolitical demand” of particular groups (Laclau, 2005, p. 224, original emphasis). It is in this
political process that a section of the community/people gets projected as the people, and the people is reduced
to mean that particular section (ibid., p. 214). With these basic concepts as reference points, we can construct a
set of seven characteristics which apply to contemporary populism: (a) a matter of degree, (b) “politics of appear-
ances,” (c) a matter of variation, (d) oscillation between rhetoric and reality, (e) differentiated and layered in its
composition, (f) politically volatile and capricious, and (g) relevant whether in or out of state power. These will
be elaborated below.
First, populism is not an “either/or” question; rather, it is a matter of degree. It is better understood not as a thing
but as a relationship, not in black and white, but in shades of grey, as we compare, for instance, the varying strands
and degrees of populism, and tendencies towards militarism, authoritarianism, or democratization of Zimbabwe's
Mugabe, Thailand's Thaksin, Philippines' Duterte, Cambodia's Hun Sen, Myanmar's Aung San Suu Kyi, India's Modi,
United States's Trump, France's Le Pen, Turkey's Erdogan, Brazil's Bolsonaro, or Russia's Putin. As Laclau (2005,
p. 45, original emphasis) puts it: “To ask oneself if a movement is or is not populist, is actually to start with a wrong
question. The question that we should, instead, ask ourselves, is the following: to what extent is a movement
populist?” The logic of this argument is derived from some of the key tasks of political actions to homogenize diverse
interests (complementary, competing, or contradictory) of social groups and their political positions into a singular
stand or voice, aimed at achieving greater salience partly by trying to deliberately blur or cloak the sharp
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contradictions and differences between social groups and classes, highlighting selective unified features that are usu-
ally deliberately distorted if not largely imagined. Often invoked is a homogeneous people.
Second, to a large extent, populism is about politics of appearances, having some parallels with Tsing's notion of
“economy of appearances”; that is, “the self‐conscious making of a spectacle [that] is a necessary aid to gathering
investment funds” (Tsing, 2000, p. 118). She elaborates, “In speculative enterprises, profit must be imagined before
it can be extracted; the possibility of economic performance must be conjured like a spirit to draw an audience of
potential investors. The more spectacular the conjuring, the more possible an investment frenzy” (ibid.). We can call
the right‐wing populist political version of Tsing's “economy of appearances” the politics of appearances: the self‐con-
scious making of a spectacle that is a necessary mechanism in gathering political support. The possibility of political
performance must be conjured like a spirit to draw an audience of potential voters, supporters, and investors; the
more spectacular the conjuring, the more possible a frenzy of political support. Of course, all “politics” engages in
“politics of appearances”; the difference with contemporary right‐wing populism is the deliberate attempt at making
a spectacle. All right‐wing populist agitations engage in spectacles (where spectacular activities and leaders feed into
each other; see also Saad‐Filho, 2018 in the context of Bolsonaro in Brazil), although their core group, supporters,
and sympathizers are investing political support as a form of speculation for rewards or benefits in the shape of social
reforms or for rent‐seeking opportunities.
Third, there are varied types of populism in relation to democracy and authoritarianism. There are right‐wing and
left‐wing authoritarian populisms, and in between them lies a diversity of possible combinations. Authoritarianism,
seen as a dynamic political process, is inherently uneven and replete with contradictions, and a regime is seldom
completely democratic or totally authoritarian. Populist currents malign the institutional establishment with pejora-
tive labels, such as “establishment insiders,” for very tactical reasons and moments. They eschew or try to subvert
conventional institutions, at least selectively and tactically. Furthermore, competing variants of populism do coexist
at the same time and in the same political‐administrative territory and do clash head‐on: Trump versus Sanders in
the United States in 2016 and Le Pen versus Melenchon in France in 2017 are examples. It is within this wide‐ranging
terrain that one has to examine populists' attitude towards social structures and institutions or towards the character
of the state (e.g., class basis and ideology) and following Scoones et al. (2018), debates on key concepts like author-
itarian populism (Hall, 1985).
Fourth, populism oscillates between rhetoric and reality, that is, “populism in word” and “populism in deed.”Many of
the neoextractivist left‐wing regimes in the Latin American “pink tide” governments veered towards populism in
deed, at least partially. One of the defining features of these regimes has been the adaptation of extractivist neolib-
eral capitalism with accompanying distributive social reforms, such as cash transfer schemes and food distribution
programmes carried out by governments under the leadership of Lula and Dilma in Brazil, Morales in Bolivia, and
Correa in Ecuador—at times under creative populist banners such as buen vivir, or indeed, “food sovereignty” (see
Arsel, Hogenboom, & Pellegrini, 2016; Chappell, 2018; Gudynas, 2011; Veltmeyer & Petras, 2014; Vergara‐Camus
& Kay, 2017). Many of these reforms are now under threat from a resurgent right in the region. Meanwhile, several
right‐wing populist groups got into power on the promise of sweeping social reforms, but there remains a huge gap
between what was promised and what was delivered. Whether this will continue to be the case is something to
watch closely.
Fifth, a populist current (right‐wing populists or progressive agrarian movements) is inherently internally differenti-
ated and layered in terms of groups and political tendencies. The layers include leaders, a core group, and a social base
of supporters and sympathizers. These sets of actors have varying agendas, roles, and degrees of commitment to the
framing of the populist agenda and agitation, which are not necessarily unified, with each one trying to use the other.
A core group is usually a mixture of diverse subgroups: ideologues committed to particular worldviews, oligarchs, rac-
ists, and sublayers of brokers, speculators, scammers, swindlers, and often circles of organized crime. The willingness
of ordinary people to let populist leaders claim them, act in their name, speak on their behalf, and bundle them
together as the people (with the whole group often rebundled in an even narrower manner, to be known simply
by the name of the populist leader) may not reflect their belief in and commitment to the populist rhetoric or trust
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in the populist leader. It may only indicate that their distrust in the old establishment or traditional elitist system is so
deep that they prefer to take a gamble on something different and unconventional. Moreover, a core group, or
subgroups within a core group, does not emerge from nowhere. A broad right‐wing populist agitation (broad, in
the sense that it includes diverse currents of conservative and right‐wing groups) mobilizes and emboldens moribund
or marginalized fringe groups engaged in hate politics, such as White supremacists and other racist groups and reli-
gious extremists whether of Buddhist, Christian, Hindu (Vanaik, 2017a, b), or Islamic (Hadiz, 2016) variants.
Sixth, each layer of actors within a populist group (leader, core group, sympathizers, or supporters) is politically
volatile and capricious in an ever‐fluid situation, where the leadership, core group, and mass base may behave differ-
ently over time, often in self‐contradictory ways. They can change their discourse at any time, as they are situational
and tactical but at the same time strategic in their political calculation. Duterte in the Philippines is an example:
engaging in left‐wing rhetoric one day and right wing the next day (Curato, 2017). This capriciousness is largely
determined by the constant need to conjure a spectacle based on what the ringleaders think the people want or
do not want.
Seventh, a populist group is relevant whether in or out of state power. The right‐wing agitations that we are inter-
ested in may or may not be in power, but their significance stands, regardless. Their location vis‐à‐vis state power has
an influence on most of the characteristics discussed here, such as how they frame their discourse or forge alliances.
Right‐wing populists that gain state power do not necessarily change the character of the state (class basis, ideology);
rather, they tend to focus on changing the regime of political rule and determining who is in and out in government
among the factions of the ruling classes and social groups. At the same time, right‐wing populists that are outside
state power should not be dismissed or taken for granted because they can significantly influence the character
and trajectory of state power. Even where other political parties promise never to include them in a coalition, the
emergence of parties like Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom in the Netherlands has forced ruling coalitions to adopt
some of the right‐wing populists' rhetoric and policies. Some groups long considered to be fringe groupings and polit-
ically irrelevant and unpopular could, in the event of a sudden change of political conjuncture, reinsert themselves
into a broader and more significant right‐wing populist current, such as the White supremacists and alt‐right in the
United States, in Austria, Germany, and Sweden, the region of Andalucía in Spain (with the rise of the Vox party in
the 2018 elections),13 or even in Indonesia, as seen in the rising influence of Islamist groups. Right‐wing populism,
viewed from an “inside/outside the state” perspective, is better seen as a continuum and from a long historical
sweep. Indeed, understanding Trump's right‐wing populism and the progressive populism of the La Via Campesina
and its U.S. affiliates requires us to understand the long history and moments and instances in different historical
conditions of American populist agitations (see Chrisman, 2016; Gaventa, 1982; Hobsbawm, 1987, p. 36; Taggart,
2000, p. 34).
The issue of populists being in or out of state power is partly related to the discussion on the episodic character of
populism. Mouffe (2005, p. 70) concludes that “It is no doubt encouraging to see that the appeal of [right‐wing polit-
ical parties] diminishes once they become part of the government, and that they seem able to thrive only when in
opposition.” Taggart (2000, p. 106) similarly argues, “The episodic nature of populism as a political phenomenon owes
much to its highly ambivalent relationship to institutions. This makes it necessarily short‐lived.” I agree that populism
tends to be episodic, but I am not convinced by the explanations of Mouffe and Taggart. One defining character of
the political moment is precisely that many right‐wing populists are in power and utilizing the very institutions they
once selectively attacked. In my view, the reason for the episodic character of populism is not due to populists'
13The Vox party in Spain has become the first far‐right group to triumph at the ballot box because of the country's return to democracy after the death of
Francisco Franco in 1975. Vox…exceeded all predictions to take 12 seats in the Andalucían regional election on Sunday. Although the ruling Spanish socialist
party (PSOE) won the elections, taking 33 of the 109 seats in the regional parliament, its support collapsed in the heartland it has ruled since 1982. Even
with the support of the Podemos‐led Adelante Andalucía coalition—which won 17 seats—the PSOE would still be short of the 55 seats needed for a major-
ity in the regional parliament. The conservative People's party took 26 seats, whereas the centre‐right Ciudadanos party won 21. Were the two rightwing
parties to join forces with Vox, they would jointly command a majority, with 59 seats. (Jones, 2018, n. p.). In January 2019, the three right‐wing parties
brokered an agreement that guarantees that the People's party candidate will become the next regional president. This will be the first time since the
end of Francoism that Andalucía has a right‐wing government.
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ambivalence towards formal liberal institutions, but rather, it is a result of the cyclical nature of the crises of capital-
ism and by extension, the crises of political rule (see also the analysis by Saad‐Filho, 2018 on Brazil).
3 | IMPORTANT DEBATES ON AGRARIAN POPULISM
There is nothing inherently progressive in agrarian populist movements—despite the often celebratory claims by such
social movements and their supporters in contemporary agrarian politics. Historical cases include instances when
agrarian movements took a conservative or reactionary political stance. One objective of this essay resonates with
Paxton's reason for studying the 1920s and 1930s French countryside in order to understand fascism in France.
Paxton (1997, p. 6) laments, “[I]t was in the countryside that both Mussolini and Hitler won their first mass following,
and it was angry farmers who provided their first mass constituency. Yet, so far, every student of fascism in France
has ignored the countryside.” He concludes, “Given the salience of angry farmers in the success of fascism elsewhere
and the importance of the peasantry in the French society, that is a crippling omission” (ibid.). Today, nearly all of the
right‐wing populists, both those in power and those not (yet) in power, have very significant electoral and political
support from the rural population. How are we to understand this situation, and what is to be done?
Populist agitation is always antagonistic to an “other.” The “us” cannot be constructed without conjuring up a
“them.” But to the extent that the us is defined or constructed, this is always framed as “the anti‐status quo,” “the
anti‐establishment,” “the subaltern,” “the underdog,” “the wronged,” “the violated,” “the looked‐down,” “the pushed
aside,” “the left‐behind,” or “the challenger.”14
In critical agrarian studies, populism has a broad meaning similar to that discussed so far. The provenance of con-
temporary agrarian populism is the left‐wing Russian narodniks during the second half of the 19th century who aimed
to overthrow tsarist rule and to rescue the surviving Russian peasant communes (obshchina) and their organizational
structure (mir), which they believed could contain the seed for a possible socialist future. Narodnism (narod broadly
means people) was a “restorative struggle” with a tendency to romanticize communities where capitalist relations
had not yet fully taken hold. Thus, the peasantry was seen as a route to socialism without having to pass through
the capitalist phase of development.
It was estimated that about 2,000 to 3,000 urban students went to the Russian countryside in 1874, with a cer-
tain degree of spontaneity, without any written programme or organization. These young intellectuals did not know
much about peasant life or the practicality of political work. “Moving from village to village, they distributed revolu-
tionary pamphlets and talked indiscriminately to the peasants who crossed their path about the need to radically
redistribute land and engage in revolution” (Taggart, 2000, p. 50). The narodniks would soon be frustrated by what
they discovered about peasants' politics: the peasantry did not have the appetite for revolution. The urban intellec-
tuals imagined and expected peasants “to be oppressed, idealistic and ripe for revolution. In practice they found the
peasants to be acquisitive, conservative and profoundly suspicious of the students” (ibid., p. 52). Many of these peas-
ants would tip off the authorities about the presence of the narodniks. By 1877, most of the students, about 1,611,
had been arrested. In Taggart's words (ibid., p. 52), “The summer of 1874 showed what a group of activists could do.
More than that, it showed what the peasantry would not do.” The narodniks shifted strategy from educating the
peasantry to engaging in armed struggle, in the form of assassination attempts at the tsarist authorities, especially
the tsar, some successful, mostly not. Two organizational groupings came about, “Land and Freedom” (Zemlya i Volya)
and the “People's Will” (Narodnaya Volya); the latter successfully assassinated Tsar Alexander II in 1881 (see also
Bernstein, 2018).
The intellectuals in the People's Will read Capital and got into direct contact with Karl Marx. Vera Zasulich wrote
to Marx: “[W]e often hear it said that the rural commune is an archaic form condemned to perish by history, scientific
socialism and, in short, everything above debate. Those who preach such a view call themselves your disciples par
excellence: ‘MarksistsMarxists’.” She continued, “Their strongest argument is often: “Marx said so”. You would be
14See further elaboration in Panizza (2005).
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doing us a very great favour if you were to set forth your ideas on the possible fate of our rural commune, and on the
theory that it is historically necessary for every country in the world to pass through all the phases of capitalist pro-
duction” (Zasulich, 1983, p. 98–99 [original February 16, 1881]). To which Marx responded, after several lengthy
draft versions of his reply, “The analysis in Capital…provides no reasons either for or against the vitality of the Russian
commune. But the special study I have made of it, including a search for original source material, has convinced me
that the commune is the fulcrum for social regeneration in Russia” (Marx, 1983, p. 124 [original March 8, 1881]). The
exchange between Zasulich and Marx has been the subject of much controversy and debate in the literature of
Marxist agrarian studies about populism (see Bernstein, 2018; Shanin, 1983a).
Although the original Russian populism was short‐lived, its legacy and influence would continue on, partly
because of its key element, namely, its principal commitment to socialism—albeit trying to take a route via the peas-
antry. As Hobsbawm (1987, p. 199, cited in Bernstein, 2018, p. 1131) puts it, narodnism “is not significant for what it
achieved, which was hardly anything, nor for the numbers it mobilised, which hardly exceeded a few thousand ... [but
that it] ... formed, as it were, the chemical laboratory in which all the major revolutionary ideas of the nineteenth cen-
tury were tested, combined and developed into those of the twentieth century.” These ideas were inextricably linked
to parallel and subsequent debates in Marxism, from Engels' formulation of the peasant question and Kautsky's for-
mulation of the “agrarian question” (Engels, 1894; Kautsky, 1988 [orig. 1899]), to Russian revolutionary ideas and
practices from Leninism and the Chayanovian socioeconomic logic of the peasant economy (Lenin, 2004 [orig.
1905]; Chayanov, 1966, [orig 1925]),15 and even to contemporary Marxism (see Akram‐Lodhi & Kay, 2010a,b;
Levien, Watts, & Yan, 2018)—all of which are relevant in the current, early 21st century conjuncture. Narodnism,
decimated after 1881, was reincarnated “in the form of a ‘Social Revolutionary’ party in the early 1900s,” and it would
“become the major rural party of the left” (Hobsbawm, 1987, p. 295). For Shanin (1983b, p. 271),
The crux of the originality and illumination of the Russian revolutionary populist lies … in the posing of a
number of fundamental questions concerning capitalist society, its ‘peripheries’ and the socialist project.
The attempts to disqualify those questions as belonging to the past only, i.e. representing the Russian
social backwardness in the 1880s or the petty bourgeoise nature of its peasantry, have proved wrong
by historical experience. The decline of peasant Russia did not make those questions disappear; quite on
the contrary, most of them became increasingly global and pertinent also in super‐industrial
environments. Such questions left unanswered come back to haunt socialists time and time again, and
will proceed to do so until faced, theoretically and politically. They can be avoided only at socialism's peril.
It is important to clarify a central point: how did the politically loaded term populism originate, evolve, and come
to have such a negative meaning in the Marxist academic and political tradition? In the history of some communist
parties, “(neo)populism” was viewed from a “revolutionary–counterrevolutionary” framework that could—and did
—lead to recurring bitter factional purges, a position impacted by a small but, at some point, influential section of
sectarian Marxists. We turn to Shanin once again for his interpretation of the history of this term that is central in
the current paper. He explains it in the context of Marxism and the narodniks, demonstrating that the history of this
term was intertwined with right‐wing populism:
The label ‘populist’, like that of ‘marxist’, is badly lacking in precision; the heterogeneity of both camps was
considerable. In Russian speech a populist (narodnik) could have meant anything from a revolutionary
terrorist to a philanthropic squire. What makes it worse is the fact that there are today no political
heirs to claim and defend the heritage of Russian populism — political losers have few loyal kinsmen,
while the victors monopolise press, cash and imagination. Lenin's major work … from which generations
15Chayanov's theories of the peasant economy would become a key influence in subsequent agrarian discourse and among towering agrarian scholars such
as Shanin (1972), Scott (1976) and van der Ploeg (2013). The extent to which the original narodnism and Chayanov have informed contemporary agrarian
populism is something that, in my view, is generally assumed or theoretically extrapolated rather than demonstrated. This is relevant, especially because
most of the important agrarian movements do not make explicit the theoretical provenance of their political frameworks, and the few that do refer explicitly
to their theoretical inspirations actually invoke Marx, and sometimes even Lenin—but never Herzen, Chernyshekvskii or Chayanov.
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of socialists learned their Russian terminology, used ‘populism’ as a label for a couple of writers who stood
at that time on the extreme right wing of the populists. … This made Lenin's anti‐populist argument of
1898 easier, while increasing the obscurity of the populist creed to his readers of today. (Shanin,
1983a, p. 8)
Agrarian populism is plural and diverse. Terence J. Byres, in his 1979 classic critique of the populism of Michael
Lipton (1977), identified three types of agrarian populism: classical populism, neopopulism, and liberal populism (Byres,
1979). He would later, in 2004, advance the notion of neoclassical neopopulism to categorize the body of work of
Griffin, Khan, and Ickowitz (2002), as well as Lipton.16 Neopopulism is essentially identified with Chayanov (1966
[original 1925]). Byres' basis for categorization includes the position taken on social differentiation among the
peasantry, the role of rich peasants, industrialization, revolution, private property, and socialism. It is a useful heuristic
tool that can help improve our understanding of the so‐called agrarian populist movements today, within and across
right‐wing and left‐wing agrarian movements. This is particularly helpful when problematic narratives tend to assume
that the neoclassical economics version of populism is progressive, whereas Marxist advocacy for socialism is out-
dated and dogmatic.
Following Byres' categories and looking at the examples of the La Via Campesina and the International Planning
Committee for Food Sovereignty, one can conclude that the majority of the affiliated movements have the following
characteristics: (a) anti‐capitalist; (b) not antirevolution; (c) not antiindustrialization (although industry and progress
have to be redefined); (d) believe in the power of small farmer production—but only under certain conditions of dem-
ocratic property regimes and technological advancement; (e) do not consider people in the countryside to be an
undifferentiated mass; and (f) do not support the polarized view of the “oppressed rural mass versus urban oppres-
sors.” Are there tendencies within these movements to gravitate around each of Byres' ideal‐type populisms?
Definitely. Some members of the La Via Campesina from Central and Eastern Europe do not want to hear anything
about a socialism especially of the type that existed in their region in the past (although they may be open to the
kind of socialism defined by Wright). In addition, the key La Via Campesina movements in India are champions of
Byres' neopopulist pole. Tendencies to pick up some elements of classical populism, especially those combining an
anti‐capitalist and socialist discourse, with agrarian societies as spearhead, are palpable in some discourses of influ-
ential individuals and movements within some sections of the La Via Campesina. Yet, on the opposite pole, one will
see a commitment to Marxism, or even disciplined adherence to classic Leninist principles, from other member
movements of La Via Campesina. What appears at the first sight as a unified position within the La Via Campesina
as a global movement is in fact better seen as a series of temporary outcomes of conjunctural political struggles inter-
nal to the movements that are in turn underpinned by various ideological currents. Understanding these ideological
currents is key, and Byres' typology of agrarian populism is a useful reference point.
Following this discussion around Byres' categories of agrarian populism, it becomes relevant to see Bernstein's
(2018) emphasis on not dismissing a priori agrarian populists as, partly and importantly, a methodological question
that calls for concrete analysis of concrete conditions. Heeding this call and taking a closer look at contemporary
agrarian movements, we will see highly differentiated national and transnational agrarian movements (TAMs) based
on class, ideology, and politics (Borras & Franco, 2009; Edelman & Borras, 2016). However, there is a persistent
16In his 1979 critique of Lipton, Byres argued that Lipton embraces classical populism in as much as he has “an almost mystical faith in the mass of the peo-
ple (who happen to be rural ‘countryfolk’)—not some of the people, but all of them who are capable…of uniting against their urban oppressors and estab-
lishing egalitarian Utopia” (Byres, 1979, p. 238). He further characterized Lipton as a classical populist because of his belief that “the small farmer is more
efficient…than the large,” as well as “a distaste for industry and a conviction that industrialization…is undesirable; an anti‐capitalist stance; a determination
to confront and reject Marxism, allied to a curious fascination with Marxist ideas” (ibid.). Byres then argued that Lipton is a neopopulist because of his
“defense…of rich peasants…in his claim that he actually accepts the need for industrialization, but in the distant future, and not if an efficient agriculture
is possible; and in his aversion to revolution” (ibid.) Byres tagged Chayanov (1966 [original 1925]) as the father of neopopulism. Finally, Byres argued that
Lipton is a liberal populist because of his “aversion to revolution” and “accompanying professed faith in reformist solutions and in the power of reason and
argument to secure social justice (even from dictators)” (ibid.). Twenty‐five years later, Byres (2004) criticized the work of Griffin, Khan, and Ickowitz (2002)
on land reform, implicating Lipton, and put forward an argument that Griffin et al. and Lipton are in fact “neoclassical neopopulist,” with their fundamentals
anchored in neoclassical economics. For the latest relevant discussions, see Bernstein (2018); Bernstein, Friedmann, van der Ploeg, Shanin, and White
(2018); van der Ploeg (2018, 2013); White (2018).
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tendency in the debates to see and label them as a unified and homogeneous movement. They are not. The various
social groups that comprise this catch‐all category of “agrarian (neo)populism”—and the movements that compete to
(re)present these, separately and collectively—are linked through class relations, and their internal politics are, at
times, marked by antagonism. The breadth and diversity increase as these (sub)national movements link horizontally
across classes and unite vertically as they forge transnational coalitions. It is therefore unfortunate that such move-
ments are often lumped together, understood and labelled, a priori and pejoratively, as amorphous agrarian populist
movements, and dismissed on that basis. Such tendencies can inadvertently undermine the potency of the Marxist
framework in advancing urgent and necessary critiques of contemporary agrarian movements on many fundamental
issues, such as uneven and inconsistent anti‐capitalist stance and campaigns; reluctance to take an explicitly socialist
platform; inconsistent position and actions in explicitly building class‐conscious broader alliances among working
people, especially among landless labourers in the countryside; and other class‐oriented issues for which a Marxist
framework is best positioned.
Contrary to the caricaturized depiction of agrarian neopopulism, many of the key movements within the La Via
Campesina represent entirely different stories. I will illustrate this point by looking at three of the founding members
of the La Via Campesina, namely, Brazil's MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra), which is a broadly Marxist
agrarian movement (Wolford, 2010), the Philippine Peasant Movement (Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas), which is
within the close orbit of a Marxist‐Leninist‐Maoist left movement (Borras, 2007; Franco, 2011; Putzel, 1995), and
Andalucía's Sindicato Obrero del Campo, which comes from a broad left‐wing tradition with significant anarcho‐syndi-
calist influences. All three movements are anti‐capitalist, with broad socialist perspectives, and all have played key
leadership roles in the La Via Campesina at various stages of the history of this transnational movement. These three
movements do not have a perfect fit in the description of classical agrarian populism, or in any of the subsequent
formulations of neopopulism; none of the three movements are nostalgic‐romantic, conservative, reactionary, or uto-
pian; none of the three are class‐blind in their political work; none of the three are antiindustrialization; and they bear
little resemblance to any of the prominent Indian rich peasant movements in terms of class base, ideology, and
politics. These movements take agrarian landed classes as the principal class adversary, with demand for land as
central—even when they take agribusiness based outside the countryside as equally important targets. This is funda-
mentally different from rich peasant agitations, such as those in India, that deliberately avoid landed classes as targets
and land redistribution and labour issues as central demands and instead target “urban elites” and/or foreign
corporations as the principal adversaries. My hunch is that it is most likely that the overwhelming majority of the
movements affiliated with the La Via Campesina are closer, in varying degrees and extents, to MST, Kilusang
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas, or Sindicato Obrero del Campo in terms of social base, ideology, and politics than to the
caricature of an agrarian populist, whether classical or neo. Interpretation, presentation, or claims about these social
movements by observers— allies, advocates, admirers, and/or sympathizers of agrarian movements, whether
academic researchers or NGOs—may not always be a precise reflection of what actually exists and cannot replace
the need for more careful empirical investigation of such questions.
There are also two international farmer federations which are worthy of note here, namely, the International
Federation of Agricultural Producers (established in 1946 and self‐liquidated in 2010; Desmarais, 2007) and, argu-
ably, its reincarnation in the form of the World Farmers Organization (Edelman & Borras, 2016). These organizations
are movements of rich commercial farmers or are politically led or influenced by the latter; they are largely based in
industrialized countries with a few members in developing countries that represent medium‐scale and rich agricul-
tural producers and farmers, such as the Zambia National Farmers' Union. Their sets of demands are fundamentally
different from the La Via Campesina's. Generally, they are defenders of capitalism and opposed to socialism. They
endorse the World Trade Organization, with reforms. Most of them can easily fit in Byres' categories of “liberal
populism” and/or neoclassical neopopulism.
It will be interesting and important to examine whether and how, and to map the extent to which, their mass
bases are linked to contemporary right‐wing populism and compare whether progressive agrarian populists acted
differently as compared with their conservative counterparts in interacting with or confronting right‐wing populism.
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It is, for example, important to investigate empirically—rather than assume theoretically—how members of the
European Coordination Via Campesina and the European affiliate of the World Farmers Organization (and
International Federation of Agricultural Producers previously), namely, Committee of Professional Agricultural
Organizations/General Confederation of Agricultural Cooperatives, are voting in the contemporary electoral contests
across Europe. It is legitimate to ask because we know that the rise of right‐wing populist groups in Europe today,
from France to Sweden and from Austria to Germany, has been electorally supported by rural voters. There is a
material basis here for possible contradictions, including the fact that many of the farmers associated with these
organizations are likely to be engaged in hiring (sometimes illegal) migrant farmworkers from Eastern Europe or North
Africa, an issue that is at the heart of the right‐wing upsurge. In a similar vein, it would be relevant to examine more
closely the politics of their American counterparts, such as the Farm Bureau, especially in relation to their attitude
towards Trump's position on immigration, on the one hand, and the issue of widespread reliance on (sometimes
illegal) farmworkers from Latin America, on the other hand. Indeed, it is important to interrogate the two key
gatekeepers of the La Via Campesina in South Asia, namely, the Karnataka State Farmers Association and Bhartiya
Kisan Union, not just in terms of the Modi regime but especially on the broader issue of rising Hindu populist nation-
alism (Vanaik, 2017a,b) and the demands they are putting forward to the current national government more broadly.
These are empirical questions.
The justification for the lengthy discussion above is to demonstrate that agrarian populism is, in reality, far
more differentiated than its homogenized and caricaturized depiction by some sections of the Marxist intellec-
tual community (academics or party cadres). Deliberately lumping groups together or failing to discern this dif-
ferentiated nature can lead to a flawed deployment even of objectively rigorous theoretical ideas and can result
in unfortunate or even disastrous political miscalculations in terms of practical politics; or worse, as is often the
case, it can lead to such movements—all movements—being dismissed altogether. Conservative rich peasant
movements exist, but these are not included in the broader category of “progressive agrarian populism/
populists” that I use in this paper, the minimum defining character of the latter being that they are radically anti‐
capitalist.
Contemporary progressive agrarian movements are relatively vibrant, as even sceptics like Bernstein (2018)
admit. Based on our definition of populism discussed above, I would argue that their political actions are populist cen-
trally because they are attempts at rebundling socioeconomically differentiated class and group interests and issues
into a more homogenized voice—“people of the land”—in relation to a constructed “other.” The rise of TAMs during
the past couple of decades, particularly the La Via Campesina, and the subsequent platform for action, that is food
sovereignty, are perhaps the most significant political processes in the social justice movements' global front because
neoliberalism took a hold in the early 1980s and subsequently debilitated conventional workers' trade unions and
movements (Desmarais, 2007; Edelman et al., 2014; Edelman & Borras, 2016; Martinez‐Torres & Rosset, 2010;
McMichael, 2008; Shattuck, Schiavoni, & VanGelder, 2015; Wittman, Desmarais, & Weibe, 2010). The La Via
Campesina is, in practice, a populist movement, based on our definition of the term (which is not necessarily
pejorative). As we have emphasized earlier, this brand of agrarian populism is not necessarily class blind, as is often
insinuated in polemics.
More generally, the assumption that populism and class blindness necessarily and always go together should be
interrogated empirically. In my view, it is precisely the class consciousness within some of theseTAMs and food sov-
ereignty movements that has led them to aggregate disparate interests and demands among differentiated social
classes and groups in political projects that are deliberately framed as multi‐class initiatives. This does not mean they
were able to resolve the inherent contradictions, or even antagonism, in some of the social relations that underpin
potential movement participants, for example, farmers and (migrant) farmworkers or rich farmer movement versus
poor peasant movement members. It only means that these class dynamics are actually flagged and are being
addressed even if unevenly and inconsistently within and between many of these movements across societies, across
political spaces, and over time. This is a necessarily tension‐filled and conflict‐ridden process, an arena of struggle
within and among movements. This issue remains one of the most underexplored themes in the study of
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contemporary agrarian movements: one possible reason for this is because it is an extremely sensitive issue and thus
quite difficult to research.
Moreover, and relatedly, many serious scholars studying agrarian movements and politics in and related to
the countryside who do not identify their scholarship solely, fully, and strictly with orthodox Marxism are not
necessarily class blind or uninformed by relevant Marxist concepts about questions of agency and politics—as a
quick, random glance at some of the influential work of numerous important scholars from across disciplines and
generations would remind us.17 A simplistic, polarized division of progressive researchers in critical agrarian studies
between strict orthodox Marxism on the one hand and an ideal‐type Chayanovian neopopulism on the other
hand does not fully capture the diversity of intellectual and political currents that actually exist and is, politically,
not very productive.
Meanwhile, it is equally important to emphasize that even class‐based politics is, like agrarian populism, diverse
and plural. Dogmatic interpretations of Marx and Lenin, or of Mao, is one strand but is not the only possible route
to the interpretation of class‐based politics, as the contrasting approaches to understanding agrarian class agency
and agrarian class politics by Eric Wolf (1969) and Jeffrey Paige (1975), for instance, remind us.18
4 | POPULISM, CLASS POLITICS, AND CRISIS
In the era of contemporary right‐wing populism, class and class politics have become even more relevant. E.P. Thomp-
son (2013, p. 9, [orig. 1968]) explains that “the class experience is largely determined by the productive relations into
which men [sic] are born—or enter involuntarily. Class‐consciousness is the way in which these experiences are han-
dled in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value‐systems, ideas and institutional forms.” He elaborates further, “If
the experience appears as determined, class‐consciousness does not. We can see a logic in the responses of similar
occupational groups undergoing similar experiences, but we cannot predicate any law.” “Consciousness of class,” he
concludes, “arises in the same way in different times and places, but never in just the same way” (ibid.).
Right‐wing and left‐wing populists are two ideologically opposed groups targeting broadly similar issues and antag-
onists. Thus, even though each takes an adversarial and antagonistic stance towards the other, their discourse,
actions, and shared elements of their anti‐establishment narratives can be objectively mutually reinforcing. In the
2016 U.S. elections, Bernie Sanders' attack against “the establishment” for having caused the closure of American
factories was cast firmly within an anti‐capitalism/anti‐neoliberalism frame, whereas Donald Trump, also speaking
out against factory closures, did not blame capitalism/neoliberalism but unpatriotic American corporations. Sanders
and Trump both gained popularity in the U.S. rust belt communities. It is thus not surprising that the social base of
an insurgent right‐wing populist group can sometimes also be the mass base of a challenger left‐wing/progressive ini-
tiative or at least the boundaries between them can be porous, blurred or malleable. The partially overlapping mass (class)
bases usually comprise those who are not part of the ideological core of the right‐ and left‐wing populist groups and
can constitute the swing vote that can be lured from left‐wing issues to right‐wing populism and vice versa. Again,
the American rust belt politics during the 2016 U.S. elections is a good example, with traditionally Democrat states
voting for Trump when Sanders failed to become the Democratic Party presidential candidate.19 Sanders and Trump
are ideological opposites for some of their core groups—“alt‐right” for Trump, socialists for Sanders—but they have
common supporters and sympathizers, and the basis of the latter, at least in the beginning, is not their ideological
stances, but the immediate, concrete issues addressed, such as factory closures amid corporate migration outside
17For example, Baud and Rutten (2004); Baviskar (1999); Clapp and Isakson (2018); Edelman (1999); Fairbairn (2014); Hall (2011); Holt‐Giménez (2017);
Isakson (2014); Li (2007, 2014); Martinez‐Alier (2014); McMichael (2008); Moore (1967); Newell and Wheeler (2006); Patel (2009); Peluso (1992); Peluso
and Lund (2011); Ribot and Peluso (2003); Scoones (2015); Scott (1976, 1985); Shanin (1972); Tsikata and Yaro (2014); Weis (2007); Wolford (2010).
18And as some more recent studies point out, such as Bernstein (2018), Bernstein et al. (2018); Cousins, Dubb, Hornby, and Mtero (2018); Lerche and Shah
(2018); Levien et al. (2018); White (2018).
19For elaboration and insiders' accounts, see Sanders (2016) and Bond and Exley (2016).
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the country. We see this dynamic play out across various themes and regions of the United States, such as coal
mining and the Appalachian communities.20
Right‐wing populist groups and anti‐capitalist agrarian movements are both insurgent anti‐establishment
challengers, although they tend to operate on different scales (with the former often in the spotlight of big politics).
Transnational agrarian movements like the La Via Campesina and food sovereignty movements are populist
movements in the sense discussed in this essay. They juxtapose the people or the “community” as the us, and
the big corporations (agrochemical corporations, food empires, banks, and so on) and landed classes and oligarchs
as the “them.” Similarly, the progressive left‐wing slogan, “the 1% versus the 99%,” is a populist but definitely
class‐conscious formulation in relative terms, compared withTrump's populism that deliberately lumps together those
in the 1% and the 99%. But still, the formulation of “99%” conceals important class conflict and tension and is prob-
lematic in many ways. The way food and agrarian movements construct powerful punchy slogans reflects such con-
sciousness in the constant invocation of the us and the other: “industrial agriculture heats up the planet, small‐scale
agriculture cools down the earth,” “not about us without us,” “people before profit,” “no to agriculture without
farmers,” “small‐scale farmers feed the world,” or “World Trade Organization kills.” Their ability to condense complex
conditions of their disparate base in short, graphic slogans that become key reference points and mobilizing narra-
tives is a brilliant populist strategy of constructing the us and its other.
Many contemporary right‐wing populist groups have evolved in a similar manner by aggregating disparate social
classes and groups in the rural world, forging a homogenizing discourse (i.e., deliberately class‐blinding narratives) and
projecting a future in ways that converge somewhat with agrarian movements and food sovereignty movements,
even when the basis, reason, and implications are fundamentally different. Le Pen's projection of “the forgotten
French countryside”21 resonates with Confederacion Paysanne's long‐standing framing of these issues—but the
two perspectives are ideological opposites as to why this happens and what is to be done.
The feeling of extreme frustration is common to both the right‐wing populist mass bases and agrarian move-
ments. In many contemporary settings, this mounting frustration derives from problems around cheap food provi-
sioning, social security and health care, jobs, neglect of public services, social decay including the menace of drug
addiction, absence of redistributive reforms like land reform, persistent violence and criminality, rural–urban migra-
tion flows, and massive indebtedness22 that, separately or together, generate much angst and anger among people
in (the cities and) the countryside. These issues are magnified during socioeconomic and political crises. It is the crisis
situation that provides the fertile ground for the populist seed to grow: the fact or threat of socioeconomic losses
among ordinary people—not only the working class, or “subproletariat,” but also the middle class, as argued by Perry
Anderson in the context of the rise of Bolsonaro in Brazil (Anderson, 2019) and Bello in the context of Chile, Thailand,
and the Philippines historically (2018)—together with the state's inability or unwillingness to act according to what peo-
ple perceive to be its moral obligation to respond in times of crisis. To make matters worse, in many instances, it is the
state that takes the lead in assaulting the remaining potential capability of poor people for social reproduction,
namely, dispossessing poor people of their access to land, often without offering alternative livelihood or employ-
ment (Levien, 2011; Li, 2010, 2011; Wolford, Borras, Hall, Scoones, & White, 2013).
Crisis revives the collective memory of past cycles of broken promises or broken systems. It is the simultaneous
convergence of multiple crises—including crisis in political rule (see, e.g., Anderson's analysis of the rise of Bolsonaro in
Brazil [Anderson, 2019])—that has triggered the current right‐wing populist upsurge. Historically, the rise of right‐
wing populism has been a response to, or accompanied by, crisis. The French “Greenshirts” peasant movement of
the 1920s and 1930s emerged in response to a triple crisis: economically (“an ever‐deepening decline of farm prices
that lasted so long and plunged so low that even the most diligent efforts could barely keep a family alive”), culturally
20This is well captured in the video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eqceHviNBC4 (viewed 19 October 2018).
21As depicted for instance in the video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N‐ooZ96nA8g (viewed 19 October 2018).
22Gerber (2014) offers a powerful analysis of the role of debt in capitalism, with reference to the rural world, which is extremely relevant in deeper analyses
of the politics of right‐wing populism and the countryside but cannot be elaborated further here for reasons of space.
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(“the low esteem for peasants” life, values, and needs'), and politically (a “crisis of representation”; Paxton, 1997, p.
11). These past cycles of broken promises of rural reforms and reform of the global food system have led to the accu-
mulation of frustration and anger among rural and urban social groups and the rise of relatively vibrant left‐wing
transnational agrarian, environmental, climate justice, and food sovereignty movements—all with strong populist
impulses and tendencies. They are increasingly linking their movements together.23
Yet the same manifestations of capitalism in crisis have also spurred the current right‐wing populist agitations,
although the latter frame such crises differently, as for example, the climate change denial of right‐wing U.S. pop-
ulists, Trump's electoral promise to revive the dying coal industry and the Brazilian Bolsonaro's similar spin on
these issues (Saad‐Filho, 2018). Whether and how the Trump administration will fundamentally differ from past
administrations in terms of its treatment of American agriculture and the countryside remains to be seen, although
current indications suggest that it will continue with similar policies. As Chrisman (2016, p. 1) explains “[a]s of
2012, just four percent of farms produced two‐thirds of agricultural value—that's a lot of wealth concentrated
in just a few hands. Today, a small number of farmers are ‘efficiently’ producing more grain than ever, while met-
ropolitan and suburban populations have ballooned.” She continues, “But what of those who remain? 46 million
Americans still live in the countryside, with many hollowed out towns, few job prospects, and the near impossibil-
ity of making a living off the land for all but the biggest farm operators” (see also Edelman, 2018; Ulrich‐Schad &
Duncan, 2018).
How the converging multiple crises are experienced and what impacts they have on the dynamic reconfiguration
of material class interests and social identity formation across social classes and groups in society provide part of the
basis for an objective alliance between right‐wing populism and agrarian populism to emerge. In other words, although
their actions are independent from each other and they may even take an adversarial stance against each other, they
actually reinforce one another. The danger will come if and when this objective alliance evolves into a subjective alli-
ance, that is, the conscious construction of an organized coalition of forces and actions. If this were to happen, with
disgruntled rural populations voting en masse for right‐wing candidates, the forces of reaction could gain much
ground and political momentum. One challenge, therefore, is how to prevent any transformation of the existing
objective alliance into a subjective alliance between right‐wing populism and agrarian populism, or even how to
undermine the objective alliance between them. Holt‐Giménez and Shattuck (2011) offer powerful analytical and
political reference points about some of these key issues in relation to food movements.24
Social media is a crucial instrument in the dynamic and fluid construction of populist identities (see Soriano, 2015)
for both types of populisms discussed here. Social media enabled, facilitated, and expanded right‐wing populists' tac-
tical rejection of conventional and institutionalized channels of contact with ordinary people. This was most effective
in penetrating the countryside in the fastest way possible and without filters from traditional elite brokers such as
churches or small town caciques and other elites. Smart phones, Facebook, and Twitter have, under certain conditions
and in various ways, democratized access to information, whether fake news or otherwise and provided mass access
to photo, audio, and video technology and resources with ease and minimal cost. The traditional role of elite allies of
geographically and socially marginalized rural population—rural school teachers, church leaders, educated young intel-
lectuals, caciques, and others (a key subject of research in classic agrarian studies)—has been radically transformed
and increasingly replaced by more diverse in situ and distant information brokers and populist agitators. For example,
a blogger and social media agitator who is part of the core group of a right‐wing populist leader can have millions of
followers on Twitter or Facebook, including those who live in the countryside. Clearly, this can be a double‐edged
sword: the same technologies enabled the volunteers for Sanders to directly, quickly, and frequently connect with
millions of people who would become supporters of the electoral insurgency; but the right‐wing upsurge led by
Trump was also largely enabled by the same technologies.
23See Borras, Moreda, Alonso‐Fradejas, and Brent (2018); Brent, Schiavoni, and Alonso‐Fradejas (2015); Claeys and Delgado Pugley (2017); Edelman and
Borras (2016); Tramel (2016, 2018); Mills (2018).
24See also Roman‐Alcalá (2018) for a related argument.
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While recognizing the dangers inherent in the expansion—in numbers and political influence—of core groups
linked to right‐wing populism, there are also dangers in fighting them. The way that some groups oppose right‐wing
populism by addressing populist leaders, core groups, and supporters can have an impact on whether the right‐wing
group is undermined or consolidated and expanded. Some popular ways of confronting right‐wing populist groups are
deeply problematic: for instance, considering a populist group to be ideologically homogeneous; perceiving a right‐
wing group to be homogeneous in terms of social class, race, and ethnicity; and assuming that there are no inherent
contradictions within right‐wing populist groups between leaders, core group, supporters, and sympathizers.
Moreover, dismissive, insulting, or condescending remarks addressed to leaders, core group, or supporters and
sympathizers can, under certain conditions, have a counter‐productive effect, consolidating the group's perception
of the antagonism between them (as the underdog) and the others (the elite). Fake news is generated and routinized
in this process. For instance, insulting Red Shirt movement participants as stupid, ignorant peasants might help to
strengthen and expand the populist core group amongThailand's northeast rural communities. Mocking Duterte sup-
porters for their imperfect and unpolished Tagalog (the minority language of the national capital and the traditional
elite) might only consolidate Duterte's base and maintain his popularity. Addressing mainstream parties and media,
Santiago Abascal, leader of the far‐right Vox party that made major electoral gains in the Andalucían regional elec-
tions in 2018, put it succinctly: “You haven't understood anything. … Every time you insult us, you are insulting
the millions of Spanish people who listen to us and identify with our message” (Jones, 2018, n.p.). When any of these
things happen, there is a danger that the core group grows as disgruntled supporters and sympathizers join them,
thus strengthening the previously tenuous relationship between populist leaders and their mass sympathizers. This
inadvertently supports the deliberate efforts by right‐wing populists to downplay or dismiss class differentiation
among their mass base, cementing the feeling that the latter is a homogeneous mass that has been uniformly
wronged. This volatile scenario is even more pronounced in the era of social media where the back‐and‐forth
exchanges are often public and where passions flare up so quickly.
5 | THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RIGHT‐WING
POPULISM AND PROGRESSIVE AGRARIAN POPULISM TODAY
It is important not to forget that, historically, rural social classes and groups have a checkered record in terms of
supporting right wing, even fascist political projects. The contemporary rural support for Trump in the United States
(Ulrich‐Schad & Duncan, 2018), Putin in Russia (Mamonova, 2016, 2018, forthcoming 2019), Le Pen in France,
Erdogan in Turkey (Adaman, Arsel & Akbulut, forthcoming 2019; Gurel et al., forthcoming 2019), Modi in India, the
Red Shirt movement inThailand supportingThaksin (Nishizaki, 2014), and the Greenshirts of 1920s and 1930s French
led by Henry Dorgeres (Paxton, 1997) all remind us of past and present rural support to right‐wing political ideas and
initiatives. Bello (2018) offers a critical reflection on the relationship between the rise of fascism, the peasantry, and
the middle class in Chile, Indonesia, Italy, the Philippines, and Thailand, seen from the contemporary context. While
not forgetting and dismissing the problematic ties between right‐wing populism and agrarian populism, it is also
important to identify and clarify the fundamental differences and the bases for these. We can see this in a number
of ways, two of which are as follows.
On the one hand, contemporary right‐wing populists and progressive agrarian populists essentially differ in their
take on the nature and causes of the current crises and how to address them, as mentioned earlier. Although both
populisms have elements of nostalgia, the right‐wing current is straightforwardly reactionary: defending or promoting
capitalism, or at least particular types of capitalism, such as Trump's “Make America Great Again” agitation or
Bolsonaro's nostalgia of past Brazilian military rule and hope for a neoliberal capitalist future projected via his
Trumpian slogan, “Make Brazil Great.” Many, though not all, progressive agrarian and food sovereignty movements
may have strong tendencies towards restorative and nostalgic narratives (“everything was fine before the agribusi-
ness came to our villages” sort of formulation), but in contrast to right‐wing populism, these are usually set within
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broader and longer perspectives of emancipatory struggles towards alternatives to, or alternatives within, capitalism
(Holt‐Giménez & Shattuck, 2011; Wright, 2016).
On the other hand, the strategies and forms of collective action of right‐wing populists and progressive agrarian
populists tend to be generally antagonistic to each other. Although it is not inherent in right‐wing populism to be
militarist or fascist (it can be at home with liberal democracy, as arguably demonstrated by the populist Corazon
Aquino government [1986–1992] in the Philippines25), recent and current right‐wing populist variants are susceptible
to or inclined towards militarist and fascist tendencies. In contrast, contemporary progressive agrarian movements,
especially those allied in the La Via Campesina, are deeply and fundamentally opposed to militarist and fascist
methods of political rule. Right‐wing populists have disdain for human rights principles, laws, institutions, and
activists, whereas progressive agrarian movements have made human rights central in framing their political struggles
(Monsalve, 2013). Food sovereignty itself is founded on the broad framework of human rights (Claeys, 2012), just as
its core component of agroecology has been framed by a section of the human rights community (De Schutter, 2014).
As discussed above, the rise of right‐wing populism is partly due to the multiple crises caused by capitalism in a
situation of unprecedented levels of wealth and affluence amid unprecedented degrees of inequality and precarity, in
an ecologically fragile world. Right‐wing populist agitations are anchored in a rhetoric in which salvation, ironically, is
thought to depend on capitalism—the very cause of the crisis, which the populist agitation purports to address.
Unfortunately, the contradiction in this is not always obvious. This is where agrarian movements and food
sovereignty become a potent social force that, together with other progressive social forces, can make a modest
but significant contribution to countering the rise of right‐wing populism. They are able to do this for a number of
material reasons.
First, shared narratives about those who were/are in state power causing much of people's misery—whether
because they are too soft or too hard on corporate giants, among others—easily resonate across sympathizers of both
right‐wing populist groups and agrarian movements. Second, as already mentioned, right‐wing populist groups and
agrarian movements may share a far larger common mass base in the countryside (and beyond) than perhaps we
imagine. The general feeling of neglect, lack of wealth and power redistribution, joblessness, and social decay in
the countryside can easily become key issues for both political groups. Third, agrarian movements and food sover-
eignty movements are often marked by their multi‐class character, and they have, on many occasions, been able
to cross class lines to forge broader alliances. For example, rural constituencies for food sovereignty have forged alli-
ances with urban sectors: workers, urban poor communities, middle class urban consumers, and so on. There is an
interesting difference or disconnect between the conditions of urban and rural classes and groups and the populisms
that emerge from their narratives or movements. In general, urban working class and precarious middle class demand
jobs, which gives the narrative of right‐wing populism considerable currency in these communities, whereas progres-
sive agrarian populists' principal demand is land (and to some extent, jobs).26 If they can be cast in terms of a broader
anti‐capitalist agitation, these two sets of contemporary urban and rural demands (which make Kay's, 2009 revisiting
of the classic debate on “urban bias” between Byres, 1979 and Lipton, 1977, both useful and timely) could dismantle
the propoor façade of right‐wing populism or that of conservative agrarian populism (especially agrarian neopopulism
led by rich peasants) and put them on the defensive.
Fourth, despite their encompassing agenda, agrarian movements rarely aspire to replace an established faction of
the elite in state rule, in the way that most “big politics” right‐wing populists do. This is a double‐edge sword, depend-
ing on specific context, because the agendas of agrarian movements can be, and have been, vulnerable to co‐optation
by the establishment they detest or by other populist groups, left wing, or right wing. There are ample examples of
25Where this type occurred, the ruling classes did not hesitate to mobilize the coercive power of the state to suppress democratic dissent, as exemplified for
instance in the Mendiola Massacre of January 22, 1987 when the military and police guarding the Presidential Palace in Manila open fired on a 20,000
strong peasant march demanding land reform, killing 13 and wounding dozens more (Borras, 2007). See also: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
wsXocipaJKA (viewed 20 January 2019).
26This also differentiates them from the conservative version of agrarian populism that is usually anchored in rich farmers' demands, namely, productivist
and remunerative issues.
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this in Latin America's “pink tide” countries where food sovereignty has been enshrined in the constitution or in
national governmental policies but interpreted in ways that contradict social movements' understanding, such as
the incorporation of food sovereignty into the broader buen vivir platforms, funded, ironically, through
neoextractivism (see Andrade, 2019; Clark, 2017; Giunta, 2014; Henderson, 2018; McKay, Nehring, & Walsh‐Dilley,
2014; Vergara‐Camus & Kay, 2017). The Zero Budget Natural Farming movement founded by Subhash Palekar in
India has gained much momentum, praise, and support from Prime Minister Modi, but its awkward or even troubling
overlap with the right‐wing Hindu nationalist current poses difficult challenges and dilemmas even for its supporters
from among the organized progressive agrarian populists. In a critical reflection, Khadse, Rosset, Morales and
Ferguson (2018, p. 214) admit that “there is sometimes an uncomfortable closeness of some elements of Palekar's
discourse to that of Hindutva's cultural chauvinism,” in addition to their observation that the majority of the Zero
Budget Natural Farming members are from the “dominant caste/middle class.”
Fifth, there is one institutional connection that links current agrarian and food sovereignty movements to right‐
wing agitation, even if they generally despise each other, namely, NGO funding. However, the link operates in a com-
peting, contradictory way.27 The rise of the global NGO complex and its multibillion dollar annual funding portfolio
has had a strategic impact on social justice movements because the latter have been among the recipients of such
funding. A significant chunk of this funding is government money from donor countries that is distributed through
the international aid infrastructure, following the logic of the neoliberalization of the development aid sector. Many
NGOs have bought into the framework that promises to deliver concrete reforms that are measurable and based on
“inclusive multistakeholder” events. This has resulted, among other things, in advocacy for specifically identifiable and
countable individual or household “beneficiaries” of specific projects. Often, these projects conveniently and deliber-
ately omit or completely dismiss class‐oriented demands and actions as something unfeasible (it might be nearer the
truth to admit that they are unfundable). For instance, society‐wide land reform was dropped in favour of targeted
participatory community‐based formal land titling; struggles for just systems of production and trade were replaced
with initiatives for farmers to become inserted into the global value chain. This has transformed many social move-
ments and NGOs by making them more politically moderate, stripping them of their original defining features: a rad-
ical social justice agenda for systems change, irreverence, and subversiveness. Despite the problematic character of
the NGO fund distribution infrastructure, it has been a critical pillar supporting the rise of social justice movements,
especially agrarian and environmental movements, and enabling them to maintain a significant presence. However,
the rise of right‐wing populism in many Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development countries, and
the accompanying demands to end such funding, have rendered this NGO complex politically vulnerable. Some
funding facilities have already partially collapsed amid right‐wing pressure to get rid of them, or to redirect the funds
to promoting the interests of national corporations (e.g., funds to promote “trade not aid,” and directly related to
national corporations). It is plausible that the weakened global donor complex has correspondingly weakened agrarian
movements and their allies worldwide. One possible unintended—but positive—outcome of such a shift could be
greater autonomy for agrarian movements. The challenge is how to extricate NGOs from their current entanglement
with government funds, reclaim their subversive roots, and strengthen their deep commitment to autonomy, social
justice, and help in building mass movements.
The final fundamental material basis that I want to note here for the opposite worldviews of right‐wing populism
and progressive agrarian movements is their competing notions of property or claims to fruits of labour. This is pow-
erfully illustrated in the contrasting ideas about property around land, as argued by Wolford (2005) in the context of
Brazil: MST's notion of property is based on the principle of “land for those who work it,” in contrast to the landed
elite's principle of land for those who have a stronger legal claim in terms of productivity and the ability to buy land
in a free market. Such contrasting views were played out in the late 1990s in the context of the World Bank's market‐
assisted land reform and are now being resurrected in the Bolsonaro era. Following Wolford (2005), it is likely that
27The discussion on this issue draws on Edelman and Borras (2016), especially the chapter on the global NGO complex and its implications for agrarian
movements.
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social relations around property and labour will remain among the most important defining elements that differenti-
ate or create cleavages between progressive agrarian populism and right‐wing populism.
6 | WHAT IS TO BE DONE? ASK BIG AND ACT INSURGENT, WITH A
SOCIALIST PERSPECTIVE
The “consensus at the centre” has dominated mainstream responses to addressing contentious issues confronting the
people. This consensus, Mouffe (2016, p. 64, emphasis added) argues, “removes from politics one of its constitutive
elements—its partisan nature.” The consensus seeks reforms within the framework of “what is doable,” leading to its
inability—or unwillingness to even try—to go beyond the limits imposed by the status quo. Perhaps what is needed is
a strategy of “what is possible.” The difference between the two is that the former works within the limits and
vpossibilities of what is doable within a given balance of social forces, whereas the latter takes an insurgent approach
to disrupt a given balance of social forces in order to pursue transformative deep social reforms. It pertains to what is
possible in terms of disrupting the pre‐existing balance of social forces and power in order to effect radical reforms
that are otherwise unthinkable, and daring to tackle political agendas that are absurdly difficult but not impossible.28
As Eric Olin Wright (2016, p. 102; original emphasis) reminds us,
Pessimism is intellectually easy, perhaps even intellectually lazy. It often reflects a simple extrapolation of
past experience into the future. Our theories of the future, however, are far too weak to really make
confident claims that we know what can't happen. …The appropriate orientation towards strategies of
social transformation, therefore, is to do things now which put us in the best position to do more later
by working to create those institutions and structures that increase, rather than decrease, the prospects
of taking advantage of whatever historical opportunities emerge.
The problems confronting the rural world are huge, persistent, and entrenched. Reviewing how capitalism has,
over time, condemned humanity and ecology to their current dire situation, Patel and Moore (2017, p. 41) suggest
that there is an urgent “need to dream for more radical change than contemporary politics offer.”29 The working class
and the middle class worldwide were angry and were demanding radical reforms. Right‐wing populists answered their
call—with programmes that were big and insurgent—with relative success (in right‐wing terms), and in many places in
the world, at least for now.
Is it politically unfeasible to ask big and act in an insurgent way in a radically progressive context? Becky Bond and
Zack Exley (2016) of the Bernie Sanders “political revolution” platform and campaign do not think so: In fact, they
think that it is the only way to go forward. They have shown, from the trenches, that it is absurdly difficult but not
impossible. Bond and Exley's book's title, Rules for Revolutionaries, is not randomly catchy. It is in direct conversation
with Saul Alinsky's classic book, Rules for Radicals (Alinsky, 1971). Bond and Exley recognized that the contribution
made by Alinsky was his central focus on the value of community organizing, anchored on immediate, concrete issues
that could deliver palpable gains to community members, all done using organizing and mobilizing methods that are
subversive and irreverent. Alinsky's approach found wide‐ranging adherents worldwide, including, not surprisingly,
among those who would become actors in middle‐of‐the‐road politics.
Ultimately, however, Alinsky's approach only aspires to alleviate the condition of poor and socially marginalized
local communities. For the Sanders team, the nature and extent of problems go far beyond a local community and
are so enormous that real solutions require agents of social change to think big, to demand system change, and to
use and pursue appropriate creative and insurgent methods of work and scale of mobilization. This was subsequently
28The concept of “difficult but not impossibly difficult; meaning, agendas that are absurdly difficult but not impossible” is inspired by and draws from the
debate between the dwarf Balin and the grey wizard, Gandalf, on the latter's proposed strategy of stealth to tackle the dragon Smaug in the Lonely Moun-
tain by recruiting a hobbit, namely, Bilbo, in J.R.R. Tolkien's Unfinished Tales, (Tolkien, 1980, pp. 430–431). See Ferguson (2015) for a framing of the enormity
of such a challenge (of the politics of distribution) and why we should not back away from it.
29For a related discussion, but with more elaboration in the context of agrarian struggles, see Borras and Franco (2018).
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framed in an open call for a political revolution by the 99%, that is, the people—the working class and the middle class
—with a socialist perspective, as the Sanders campaign put it, generating political, financial, and logistical support
from millions of ordinary people, especially from among millennials. It was a populist electoral insurgency, of a kind
that was unheard of in the annals of American history. Sanders did not win the Democratic Party primary, but the
campaign and the movement left us with a political treasure trove to mine for our own political projects wherever
and whatever these might be. The principles of ask big, act insurgent, and dare to boldly advance a democratic socialist
perspective in a context of a political revolution may actually gain traction in far more places than many might have
conservatively assumed. “Audacity is crucial…and if the democratic and progressive forces do not adopt a bold
stance, we can be sure that the extreme right will do so,” as Inigo Errejón (2016, p. 67), political secretary of Podemos
in Spain, reminds us (see also Franquesa, forthcoming 2019.30
Before going into some propositions on what is to be done, I will look briefly at three existing strategies used in
struggles against right‐wing populism, which are popular but may actually be problematic. The first is engaging in and
mobilizing around restorative narratives and campaigns, insinuating that the period prior to right‐wing populism was
good for the people. This is quite a popular tactic worldwide, especially among those who were in power prior to
the current populist upsurge, such as liberal democrats and social democrats. There is thus a compelling need to take
a two‐pronged approach to social struggles, striking simultaneously against the old regime and against the current
right‐wing upsurge.
The second is the contribution of small‐scale and “too polite and neat” campaigns and mobilizations to subverting
right‐wing populism: however, well intentioned, these may prove to be insignificant. One aspect of the “consensus
at the centre” approach that is partly responsible for the current right‐wing populist swing is the dogmatic imposition
of “multistakeholderism”—the codification of multistakeholder approaches (McKeon, 2018) to resolving class and
identity conflicts, which completely fail to acknowledge the presence of power imbalances along class and other
social hierarchies. Grand mismatches abound: for huge problems around the despotism of local rulers and chieftains,
the answer is community‐based conflict resolution mechanisms; for problems caused by extreme greed and bullying,
practised with impunity by transnational corporations, the answer is multistakeholder platforms around voluntary
self‐regulation; for the problem of land grabbing, the answer is transparent and consultative administrative processes
in land deals. There are serious class and power imbalances in these spaces where dominant actors actively ignore or
deliberately misunderstand politicized notions of “accountability” (Fox, 2007; Gaventa, 2006; Ribot, 1999), or
deliberately avoid radical interpretation and the use of governance instruments such as Free, Prior, Informed Consent
(Franco, 2014).
The third strategy is sectoral struggle (e.g., trade union or peasant or urban‐centred political work) against right‐
wing populism. This is a necessary but insufficient banner for social justice framing and for a spearhead social move-
ment that can unite the working class and others sectors and social groups that are struggling, or have the potential
to struggle, against right‐wing populism. In many societies today, the scale of operations and exposure of agrarian
movements and food sovereignty movements is limited and small relative to that of right‐wing populism. In fact,
the ideas and organizations of agrarian and food sovereignty movements in these societies shrink dramatically when
viewed from the perspective of big politics, which right‐wing populist groups steer. Today, the rural cannot be auto-
matically equated with agricultural; many rural‐based small and medium sized towns have emerged worldwide, and
these are becoming hotspots for right‐wing mass base building.
In the era of converging global crises and right‐wing populist agitations, the need for radical, deep social reforms
has only grown more urgent. Five goals of deep social reforms and ways to pursue them are relevant in the current
30The outcome of the late 2018 election in Andalucia offers an important insight in understanding the rise of right‐wing populists and the resistance to it.
According to Jaume Franquesa, “In terms of geographical and class spread, Vox's results are also interesting. Vox (and the whole right, in general) has done
better in cities than in the countryside, and within those cities, it has done particularly well in wealthy neighborhoods. But Vox has obtained very high results
in several municipalities with highly marketized, migrant labor‐based agriculture, the most eye‐catching example being El Ejido—a place where there was a
terrible antimigrant pogrom at the turn of the century—which was the only Andalusian municipality where Vox won the election (with about 30% of the
vote).” Personal email communication with Jaume Franquesa, December 4, 2018. See also Franquesa (forthcoming 2019) for a broader discussion in the
context of the Spanish experience more generally.
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conditions of the rural world, namely, redistribution, recognition, restitution, regeneration and, resistance—or in short,
revolution.31 These are deep reforms that are directed at the heart of social structures and institutions that reflect
and maintain class formation and class rule, and could, or should, ratchet up towards structural transformation that
could undermine capitalism and pave the way for a socialist alternative. Such a set of radical reforms does not recoil
from class politics; in fact, class politics is at the heart of the 5Rs.
The proposed agenda for political conversation, namely, deep social reforms, is fundamentally different from the
dominant “third way” or social‐democratic reforms because the latter actually legitimize and strengthen capitalism
through incremental reforms that are ameliorative at best32 because they shy away from addressing existing class
antagonisms and thus class politics. If taken seriously, the 5Rs proposed here constitute a political revolution and
not just a reform programme. These 5Rs require multi‐class struggles far broader than agrarian or rural struggles.
Nevertheless, agrarian movements may be able to make strategic contributions to these social struggles. We now
turn to an abbreviated discussion of each of these spheres.
First, where wealth and the means of production to create wealth are monopolized by a few (veering towards the
obscene 1–99% ratio), wealth and power redistribution becomes urgent and fundamental. In the context of agrarian
societies, this includes redistribution of access to and control of the key means of production—land, water, seas, and
forests—thus contesting the very essence of capitalism. Second, where social exclusion, marginalization, and
discrimination by one dominant social group over other groups constitute an oppressive social complex layered with
xenophobia, racism, misogyny, and so on, social struggles for recognition become an important struggle that can
expose the fundamentally regressive nature of right‐wing populism. In agrarian societies, this can entail recognition
of the rights of indigenous peoples or ethnic minorities over their territory or women's rights to their distinct access
and control of the means of production: land, water, and forests. Third, where people have lost their land, territory,
houses, savings, pensions, and other important means of production and reproduction because of corporate resource
grabs or have lost health care because of scams by financial swindlers,33 social struggles for restitution become a key
front. In many rural areas, this means restitution of access to land, territory, water, forests, especially in light of global
land grabbing during the past decade. Fourth, ecological and climate crisis is one of the hallmarks of the contempo-
rary period in world history; it has deep roots in the history of capitalism, captured by the term Capitalocene (Moore,
2017). Social struggles for ecological regeneration and environmental justice have become an integral part of broader
social justice struggles, as Martinez‐Alier, Temper, Del Bene, and Scheidel (2016) argue. This connects with what
Patel and Moore (2017, p. 43) call “reparation ecology,” with struggles for agroecological farming systems (Rosset
& Altieri, 2018), or with struggles for “agrarian climate justice” (Borras & Franco, 2018). Fifth, these four goals of deep
social reforms can only be accomplished through fierce, relentless, and disruptive resistance within and/or against
capitalism—which really means political revolution. This puts agrarian movements directly in confrontation with
right‐wing populist groups, the latter being generally believers, champions, defenders, or apologists of capitalism.
Political actions around these five social reform agendas could expose the contradictory ideological positions
between social justice movements and right‐wing populism and could contribute to progressively undermining the
latter. Right‐wing populists are unlikely to meet the social justice‐oriented demands of the people because, ulti-
mately, their basic interests fundamentally clash with the people's demands. Vanaik (2018) reminds us, for example,
that basic agrarian issues (land, food, rural jobs) render Modi politically vulnerable. The 5Rs discussed above are not
31The discussion on the 5Rs draws from a long history of my work on land politics in collaboration with several colleagues and comrades but most especially
with Jennifer Franco. This work started with a focus on redistribution and recognition, which are basically direct and logical extensions of struggles for land
and territory; more recently, especially informed by our work on land grabs and expulsions, the inseparable issue of “restoration” of resource access or “res-
titution” has been added—thus, 3Rs. In the last few years, our research work has been devoted to the intersection between climate change politics (mitiga-
tion and adaptation) and land grabbing, leading to the addition of the “regeneration” angle. The discussion and inclusion here of “resistance” is in dialogue
with Nancy Fraser's work on “redistribution,” “recognition,” and “representation” (Fraser & Honneth, 2003). For the progression of our work on this, see
Franco, Monsalve, and Borras (2015) and Borras and Franco (2018). Patel and Moore (2017, pp. 207–212) put forward a similar proposition for five Rs—
recognition, reparation, redistribution, reimagination, and recreation—where individually and collectively some of these overlap with the 5Rs in the current
paper.
32Similarly, some groups may be opposed not to the fundamentals of capitalism but only to some versions of capitalism, such as neoliberal capitalism.
33Harvey's broadly cast “accumulation by dispossession” comes to mind (Harvey, 2003).
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to be treated like a checklist from which one can cherry pick. The 5Rs are linked in their logic because they are
responding to inherently interconnected social processes. These processes can be highlighted in two abbreviated
illustrations.
On the one hand, contemporary capitalism has seized the opportunity to make profit out of responses to climate
change via market‐based transactions such as carbon sequestration and trading, biofuels, and neoliberal nature con-
servation. In essence, this is regeneration by dispossession—defined here as the capitalist project of operating within
and regenerating nature by dispossessing ordinary villagers to facilitate continuous capital accumulation. Many of
the conservation initiatives associated with climate change politics are associated, in varying degrees, with this
strategy. Alternative ways to confront regeneration by dispossession are through regeneration by restitution, or regen-
eration by recognition, or regeneration by redistribution, or a combination of all of these, in the context explained above
(see also Borras & Franco, 2018).
On the other hand, redistribution without transformation represents the prepopulist agitation period, the elitist
“business as usual” era. The various forms of redistribution that did occur—usually concessions resulting from social
struggles, such as partial land redistribution—were ultimately carried out within a hostile neoliberal system so that any
initial gains were easily cancelled out. Many land reforms in the past (both prior to and during neoliberalism) suffered
the same fate: small‐scale farmer beneficiaries lost out within a broadly neoliberal agricultural policy climate. Some
redistributive reforms provoked tensions around issues related to identity politics, such as the recognition claims
by indigenous peoples or women that were undermined by (or completely absent from) conventional land reforms.
All these have contributed to the accumulation of frustration among ordinary people, many of whom have turned
to support right‐wing populists. The struggle against right‐wing populism can be partly fought by pursuing struggles
for redistribution that dovetail with further reforms: thus, redistribution with transformation, redistribution with recog-
nition, or a combination of these (see Borras & Franco, 2018).
If we take a closer look at the 5Rs, we can begin to understand how their logics are intertwined, how their failure
(separately and collectively) under past conditions fed into the right‐wing populist “politics of appearances,” but at
the same time, how they contain the potential to subvert right‐wing populism. Middle‐of‐the‐road, social democratic
type reformers have shied away from big and insurgent reforms, justifying themselves by arguing that these are undo-
able, that is, impossible. We must not forget that most of the rights and freedoms that many of us enjoy today, such as
the 8‐hour working day, maternity leave, minimum wage laws, voting rights, civil rights, the formal end of apartheid in
South Africa, and so on, were big and insurgent issues in their own settings and historical moment and seemed impos-
sible—until the political momentum in their favour overruled any conservatism, scepticism, or pessimism.
7 | CONCLUDING DISCUSSION: TOWARD A CLASS‐CONSCIOUS LEFT‐
WING POPULISM
Errejón (2016, p. 67) argues that right‐wing populism “has been able to recuperate the powerful idea ‘community’—
that we must build a spirit of community at a time when there is more insecurity, more anxiety and fear, more uncer-
tainty about tomorrow.” What is being emphasized here is that confronting right‐wing populism should start with a
good grasp of how and why right‐wing populists have been effective in what they are doing. In the context of con-
temporary right‐wing populism, Errejón (2016, p. 68) laments that there is a mistaken assumption that populist
methods of work “could be paving the way for [right‐wing populist] ideas.” He disagrees, “it helps [right‐wing popu-
lism] much more if we abandon all forms of collective affects [i.e. ‘passion’], and thus cede this space to them.”
Mouffe (2016, p. 124) insists on “reappropriating the term populism.” She goes on, “That it is being used in a derog-
atory way by parties who defend the status quo is no reason to abandon it. It's necessary to reclaim it…and to give it
a positive meaning with the notion of ‘left‐wing populism’.”
A priori dismissal of agrarian populism as class blind, naively and romantically allocating everyone a seat at the
table is a classic case of a straw person argument because such a populism does not exist. Populism as defined
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and discussed so far inherently includes groups of people across classes—and by the same token, and dialectically, it
inherently excludes groups of people. The inclusion–exclusion process of “othering” does not give a seat to everyone
at the table. Progressive agrarian populism, in generic terms, is similar to Leninist or Maoist notions of a “broad united
front,” or indeed, Mao's “mass line” which is, arguably, essentially a form of populism; significantly different but fun-
damentally similar in the sense that both are attempts at aggregating varying, and even competing, social class and
group interests (see Mao, 1975). As Shanin (1983b, p. 270) reminds us, “Russian populists did produce a class anal-
ysis, if a different one from that of Engels, i.e. concluding that unlike France of 1848, or of 1871, the main forces due
to face each other in Russia are the state and a state‐bred squiredom and capitalists versus the ‘labouring class,’ i.e. a
plebeian front of peasants, workers and intelligentsia, allied with the radical soldiers.” Finally, perhaps most of the
peasant movements studied by Eric Wolf, with special reference to the agency of the middle peasantry, may, to some
degree, qualify in the category of agrarian populism (Wolf, 1969). The flip side of this is that only the agrarian move-
ments under the tight command of dogmatic strands of “workerist” Leninist parties could not be accused of populism
in the latter's pejorative meaning. Theoretically, this is questionable; politically, it is problematic because this type of
agrarian movement does not constitute a significant global force today.
The use of the term working people seemed to be generally acceptable to most Marxists, sometimes to denote
the basic “worker–peasant alliance,” but as Shivji (2017) argues, it is poorly elaborated. Shivji himself elaborates on
the concrete basis underlying the concept of working people, especially in the context of neoliberalism—an explana-
tion that largely overlaps with Bernstein's (2010) notion of “classes of labour”:
Commodification and privatization of health care, education, water, sanitation and removal of subsidies
from essential foods which all formed part of the social wage goods previously means that now the poor
have either to pay for it or go without. All in all, the materiality which underlies producers—peasants
and pastoralists, proletarians and semi‐proletarians, street hawkers selling consumer goods and peddlers
selling cooked food, operators and repairers in backyard workshops—in virtually all sectors is the
minimizing of their necessary consumption and maximizing their labour. …This is then the material basis
common to all sectors of what I called the working people. (Shivji, 2017, p. 11)
Shivji's elaboration on the notion of working people and Bernstein's classes of labour are important conceptual
bases for an idea of “class‐based populism,” or “class struggles with populist consciousness or sensitivities,” or indeed
class‐conscious left‐wing populism. Each of these formulations can be described as a contradiction in terms, highlight-
ing concrete contradictions that are partly reflective of the current conditions of the peasantry, working class, and
precarious section of the middle class. This, in turn, impacts political agency and agrarian politics in various ways,
as well as how we understand these (Bernstein, 2010; chapter 8; Moyo & Yeros, 2005). Shivji's argument is relevant
in this context; he claims that working people “is a ‘class’ against capital and has great potency in political discourse
and mobilization. …I believe politically, and even conceptually, the term working people has greater potency and
validity than worker–peasant alliance.” He elaborates, “only real life struggles against the neoliberal phase of capitalist
imperialism will help us further to theorize the concept of working people” (Shivji, 2017, p. 12, original emphasis).34
The notions of classes of labour and working people can partly explain the rise both of left‐wing populist groups
(Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece—before all the internal problems in both parties had erupted) and of right‐wing
populist groups who are able to conjure a community of such classes of labour or working people using language that
is emotive and dramatic: “the left‐behind,” “the pushed aside,” “the forgotten,” and so on.
Two further concepts warrant elaboration, namely, socialism and revolution. If the problem is capitalism, it
becomes inconceivable to find a positive future within it because capitalism is a system that is fundamentally based
34It is in the context of the current fragmentation of classes of labour (in Bernstein's framing) and of Shivji's working people—amid the rise of various forms
of populism—that we also need to take seriously the condition and politics of intersectionality. As Bernstein (2010, p. 115, original emphasis) reminds us:
“class relations are universal but not exclusive ‘determinations’ of social practices in capitalism. They intersect and combine with other social differences
and divisions, of which gender is the most widespread and which can also include oppressive and exclusionary relations of race and ethnicity, religion
and caste.”
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on exploitation, oppression, and greed (i.e., profit making). This brings us back to socialism—defined here in the
broadest sense as per Wright (mentioned at the beginning of this paper). The immediate and most difficult challenge
we face here is similar to the problem of reclaiming populism in the context of agrarian politics: “Socialism” is a term
that comes with a lot of baggage. It is a proposition that is passionately contested and debated, where each strand of
proposition will surely disappoint many. Aware of this, but needing a reference point for the purpose of this paper, I
find Wright's proposition for a socialist alternative in the current context helpful. He framed his socialist agenda
within a three‐pronged strategy of struggles within and against capitalism, namely, ruptural (new emancipatory insti-
tutions via a sharp break with existing institutions and social structures; closely associated with revolutionary social-
ism), interstitial (building new forms of social empowerment in the niches and margins of capitalist society; associated
with some strands of anarchism), and symbiotic (using “the state to extend and deepen the institutional forms of
social empowerment in ways which also solve certain practical problems faced by dominant classes and elites,”
closely associated with social democracy; Wright, 2016, pp. 100–101). This is useful for the argument being devel-
oped in this paper in at least two ways: (a) the agenda is wide enough to accommodate different anti‐capitalist pro-
gressive social forces and (b) the institutional, organizational, and political forms and requirements are broad enough
to allow for various strands of anti‐capitalist and potentially prosocialist forces (or at least those who are not opposed
to socialism or not opposed to forging alliance with socialists) to converge. As Wright suggests, “the framework pro-
posed here for a socialism rooted in social empowerment involves a commitment to institutional pluralism and hetero-
geneity” (2016, p. 104, emphasis added). If we take this framework and we look at the range of ideologically diverse
large transnational movements like the La Via Campesina, we can see how such a space can accommodate (to a sig-
nificant, if not full, extent) the plurality of progressive movements willing and able to identify with a broadly cast
socialist agenda and how it can contribute political resource to such a political project—long‐term and short‐term
goals in the struggles within and/or against capitalism—depending on their capacity and ideological orientation.
The deep social reforms explored earlier around the 5Rs and the social forces required to struggle for such
reforms can be located within and be made to serve Wright's proposed framework and three‐pronged strategy for
socialism. Moreover, this is a kind of socialism and strategy around which a broad mass base can be rallied, from
the conventional left to anarchist groups, including contemporary antifa groupings and degrowth advocates, from
Sanders' typical supporters among the millennials and precarious middle class to the multitude of hard‐up classes
and sectors that formed the base and supporters of arguably left‐wing populist political parties like Podemos in Spain,
from radical agrarian movements to urban food justice activists, from radical feminists to climate justice activists,
from indigenous peoples' emancipatory movements to progressive race political activists.
The conventional left's notion of a “vanguard party” or “corps of cadres” to lead mass movements is unlikely to be
effective as a spearhead even though the current situation could benefit from reinvigorated left political parties. Nor
is Mao's idea of armed struggle as the principal form of struggle, subordinating all other forms of mass movements,
likely to be able to provide an overarching strategy and form of struggle. As Wainwright (2018) reminds us, those
working from this tradition will have to seriously rethink how to forge productive conversations with those who sub-
scribe to other traditions, for example, the ideas of anarchism and its stance on antiauthoritarianism and
anticentralism (Bookchin, 2015; Springer, 2015; see also Roman‐Alcalá, 2018), the growing advocacy and movement
around the idea of degrowth (Boillat, Gerber, & Funes‐Monzote, 2012; Kallis, 2017; Roman‐Alcalá, 2017), feminist
(Harcourt & Nelson, 2015) and race politics (White, 2017), and so on—keeping in mind that socialist and communist
parties' historical track record of engaging with such advocacies and movements has been checkered at best.35 How-
ever, and conversely, without the participation of conventional left‐wing communist and socialist parties, the various
groupings of non‐political party radical movements and initiatives are unlikely to get closer to their goals of transfor-
mative social change, as many major waves of such initiatives in the recent past, such as the OccupyWall Street, have
shown. The key is to explore and harness potential synergy among these disparate democratic challengers is less
35For those working in the context and tradition of communist and socialist party work, Rosa Luxemburg's earlier ideas of a “mass party” and “mass strike”
and Antonio Gramsci's notion of “organic intellectuals” may have renewed relevance and traction and are worth serious revisiting.
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about determining which specific political line or idea is superior and thus could be the spearhead, than about deter-
mining and building the basis for a pluralist platform that could bring such diverse groups to a common political project
—however daunting a task that might appear.
The greatest challenge may prove to be how to sustain the initial mild interest in—or at least the non‐resistance to
—socialism of the types espoused by Sanders' supporters, the agrarian and food sovereignty movements, and the
broad environmental and climate justice activist circles, many of which may not have been sensitized to and signifi-
cantly engaged in socialist politics despite their deep anti‐capitalist sentiments. Given that Sanders managed to boldly
put forward an openly socialist agenda to be carried out through a political revolution in the context of the United
States in the early 21st century, and because of millions of people across the middle class and working class and
across the race, gender, and generational divides came on board, energized, and animated, a broader international
conversation and political project explicitly framed within socialism becomes feasible—and so too the vehicle to
achieve it, political revolution. The term is used here in a similar way as it is used by Sanders: “a deep commitment
against the anti‐subversive petty reform incrementalism promoted by social forces behind the ‘consensus at the cen-
tre’.” This task represents a difficult challenge partly because the justifications, mechanisms, and processes of the
“petty reform incrementalism” have been routinized and normalized to the point that they invisibilize what is wrong
with, or disqualify serious interrogation of, this approach and the many issues that matter to people.
Combining class politics and populism is desirable despite the tension and contradictions that such an intersection
necessarily internalizes. What is promising, along this line, is an enriched and reinvigorated left‐wing populism, that is,
anti‐capitalist in character, socialist in orientation, pluralist in ideological orientation, heterogeneous in institutional
platforms, and fundamentally founded on an alliance between the classes of labour or working people (which neces-
sarily includes the various strata of the peasantry and proletariat) and the precarious strata of the middle class or
petty bourgeoisie, and their overlapping social groupings based on multiple “identifiers,” including community, gender,
race, ethnicity, generation, and religion. This form of populism is very different from an essentially identity‐based
populism where class is altogether absent or is deliberately negated, a mere footnote, or an afterthought, addressed
only if and when it is referenced.
This reclaiming and reformulation constitutes a sharp rebuke of certain problematic populisms in the agrarian tra-
dition. Iconic examples include some Indian populist peasant movements (Assadi, 1994; Brass, 1994, 1995). The
problem with these types of movements is not that they are class blind because, arguably, they are not. The problem
is their consciousness of the antagonistic class interests that exist, and their deliberate effort to downplay or cover‐up
the tensions and contradictions within a movement or political agitation to create a single discourse under the dom-
inant class—that is rich peasant—banner. When such peasant movements consciously block rural working class issues
such as land reform, landless labourer's work and wage issues, and so on, from getting onto the agenda of populist
mobilizations, and instead narrowly focus on “fairer” (always meaning “higher”) prices for their produce, defence of
the private property regime, and so on, they acquire a conservative character (Brass, 1994, 1995; Pattenden,
2005). This is not a naïve type of agrarian populism; it is a consciously reactionary type of populism. Yet most con-
temporary agrarian and food sovereignty movements do not share this type of reactionary agrarian populism.
Finally, a tradition that comes from class‐based movements has become more urgent and necessary than ever,
namely, an internationalist perspective. The emergence of Bernstein's ‘classes of labour’ or Shivji's working people is
a global phenomenon. The issues that are addressed by all strands of populism are not confined to a national territory;
they are international and are inserted into the dynamics of global capitalism. Anti‐capitalist struggles are to be
fought within national territories and internationally. Food sovereignty movements have actual and potential contri-
butions to make, albeit unevenly across space and over time, to struggles that are (sub)national with an international
perspective and international with (sub)national roots. Internationalism can be a counterweight to the xenophobic
nationalism of right‐wing populist agitations. An internationalist perspective takes as its starting point that social class
and other identity struggles are fought in local communities, but that solidarity struggles are necessary, and necessar-
ily cross‐border in character, because of the international interconnection of the causes, conditions, and conse-
quences of the multiple crises caused by capitalism.
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I conclude this essay by going back to Henry Bernstein's appeal for Marxist political economists to take agrarian
politics and agrarian populism seriously, dovetailing this appeal with a recent observation by Michael Levien, Michael
Watts and Yan Hairong (2018, p. 853): “While Marxists have long criticized ‘populists’ for ignoring capitalism and
class, populists have charged Marxists with an obsessive concern with accumulation and class, an insensitivity to
the contingencies of history and various blindspots regarding gender and identity.” They conclude,
On the one hand, more ‘populist’ scholarship — whether focused on land grabs, food sovereignty or land
reform — has far more explicitly incorporated Marxian insights about class and the dynamics of
capitalism than ever before. On the other hand, much explicitly Marxian scholarship has moved away
from its dismissal of peasant political agency; the hyper‐structuralism of modes of production debates;
and linear or Eurocentric conceptions of history embedded in the transition problematic and ‘doomed
peasant dogma’. (ibid., p. 854)
This intellectual and political reciprocity does not undermine the fundamental standpoint of each camp. Teodor
Shanin observed the process between the People's Will intellectuals and Marx, how each treated the other seriously
and how each was willing to concede some important elements in their perspective: “That does not make Marx into a
populist or turn members of the People's Will into crypto‐marxists. They were political allies, who supported and
influenced each other” (Shanin, 1983b, p. 268). Indeed, such a productive encounter is urgently needed in building
and reinforcing an agenda for political conversation around the notion of a reconstituted, class‐conscious, left‐wing
populism in order to defeat right‐wing populism and to pave a path toward a possible socialist future.
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